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prosecution, which prohibits retaliation against a criminal defendant for the exercise of a legal
right. It presents a new historical account of the doctrine's accidental origins. It argues that a
revitalized conception of vindictiveness may be relevant to current controversy and doctrinal
innovation surrounding prosecutorial discretion and coercive plea bargaining. A rule prohibiting
a prosecutor's deliberate punishment of a defendant's exercise of her right to trial may allow for
substantive limits on prosecutorial discretion, but in a way that respects rather than undermines
the right to trial.
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INTRODUCTION
The day after the Internet activist and hacker Aaron Swartz committed
suicide in January 2013, his family angrily described his death as "the product
of a criminal justice system rife with intimidation and prosecutorial
overreach."' The federal government had "contributed to his death," they
argued, by bringing an "exceptionally harsh array of charges" for his
unauthorized downloading of materials from the academic database JSTOR.'
Subsequent commentary agreed that Swartz had been pursued
overzealously. Larry Lessig passionately criticized "the absurdity of the
prosecutor's behavior," arguing: "Somehow, we need to get beyond the 'I'm
right so I'm right to nuke you' ethics that dominates our time. That
begins with one word: Shame."' Many others with a variety of ideological
leanings agreed.4
Some characterized the behavior of the U.S. Attorney's Office as
"vindictive."' The prosecutors' approach at least outwardly appeared to be
1. Official Statement from Family and Partner ofAaron Swartz, REMEMBER AARON SWARTZ (Jan.
12,2013), http://www.rememberaaronsw.com/statements/family.html.
2. Id.
3. Lawrence Lessig, Prosecutor as Bully, LESSIG BLOG, V2 (Jan. 12, 2013), http://lessig
.tumblr.com/post/4o347463o44/prosecutor-as-bully.
4. See, e.g., Matt Pearce, Aaron Swartz Suicide Has U.S. Lawmakers Scrutinizing Prosecutors, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 18, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/18/nation/la-na-nn-aaron-swartz
-congressional-scrutiny-20130118 (quoting Representative Darrell Issa, a Republican, as
stating of the Swartz prosecution: "[To t]hrow the book at them and find all kinds of
charges and cobble them together so that they'll plea[d] to a 'lesser included' is a technique
that I think can sometimes be inappropriately used"); Brendan Sasso & Jennifer Martinez,
Lawmakers Slam DOJ Prosecution of Swartz as "Ridiculous, Absurd," THE HIL: HILLICON
VALLEY (Jan. 15, 2013, 6:52 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/277353
-lawmakers-blast-trumped-up-doj-prosecution-of-intemet-activist (quoting Representative
Jared Polis, a Democrat, as calling Swartz a "martyr" and the charges "ridiculous and
trumped-up").
5. E.g., Victoria Cavaliere, "Vindictive" Legal Prosecution Drove Reddit Co-Founder
Aaron Swartz to Suicide: Girlfriend, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2013, http://www
.nydailynews.com/news/national/legal-woes-drove-swartz-suicide-girlftiend-article-1.1242463;
Jonathan Blanks, Aaron Swartz and Our Broken justice System, BLANKS SLATE (Jan. 13, 2013,
9:48 AM), http://blanksslate.blogspot.com/2013/o1/aaron-swartz-and-our-broken
-justice.html; Cory Doctorow, Lessig on the DoJ's Vindictive Prosecution of Aaron Swartz,
BOING BOING (Jan. 12, 2013, 11:21 AM), http://boingboing.net/2oi3/ol/12/lessig-on-the
-dojs-vindictiv.htnil; Glenn Greenwald, The Inspiring Heroism ofAaron Swartz, GUARDIAN:
COMMENT IS FREE (Jan. 12, 2013, 4:25 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2ol3/jan/i12/aaron-swartz-heroism-suicide; ThoughtWorks Mourns Aaron
Swartz, THOUGHTWORKS (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.thoughrworks.com/news
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aimed at making the defendant suffer a severe price for conduct that hurt no
one and resulted in no financial gain. In the ordinary sense of the word,6 the
government's conduct may well have been vindictive. But it almost certainly
was not vindictive in the legal sense.
Legal vindictiveness does not refer to a prosecutor's generic ill feeling
toward, or even his desire to harm, a defendant. Rather, as defined by the
Supreme Court, vindictiveness means that a prosecutor has retaliated against a
defendant for the exercise of a legal right, denying her due process.' One might
think, then, that pursuing more severe charges or a harsher sentence after a
defendant exercises her right to a jury trial9 would constitute vindictiveness.
But it doesn't. The law specifically permits severely penalizing defendants for
going to trial in an effort to induce a guilty plea-or, in the Court's words,
"openly present[ing] the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of
forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to
prosecution."o
Using charging discretion aggressively to pressure defendants into pleading
guilty is exactly what the existing doctrine of vindictive prosecution permits.
And this is, by and large, what prosecutors do." But this conduct is precisely
/thoughtworks-mourns-aaron-swartz; Marcy Wheeler, Aaron Swartz Reveals the Hypocrisy of
Our Justice Department, SALON (Jan. 15, 2013, 7:37 PM), http://www.salon.com/2o13/ol/16
/aaron swartz reveals the-hypocrisy of our Justice department.
6. See Vindictive, MERIUAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/vindictive (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (defining the word "vindictive" to mean "intended for
or involving revenge" or "intended to cause anguish or hurt").
7. See Bennett L. Gershman, Was Aaron Swartz a Victim ofProsecutorial Overkill?, HUFFINGTON
POST: BLOG (Jan. 18, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bennett-1
-gershman/adam-swartz-prosecutionb_2496485.html (noting that, while the prosecutors'
pursuit of Swartz appeared "Javert-like," there was no evidence that they "violated any legal
or ethical rules").
8. See Blacldedge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974); infra Section I.C.
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1o. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); see infra Section I.D.
ii. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HAlv. L. REV.
2463, 2471-76 (2004) (describing prosecutors' incentives to obtain pleas). There are, of
course, exceptional actors, jurisdictions, and cases throughout the system, and in some
individual instances the exercise of discretion produces more humane and more just results.
Structurally, however, prosecutors are in control, and too much so. See William J. Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001) ("As criminal law
expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the hands of police and prosecutors
.... The end point of this progression is clear: criminal codes that cover everything and
decide nothing, that serve only to delegate power to district attorneys' offices and police
departments."); see also Radley Balko, The Power of the Prosecutor, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 16, 2013, 10:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2oi3/ol/i6/the-power-of-the
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what many people found reprehensible and "vindictive"" about the
government's generally ordinary" treatment of Aaron Swartz. The Swartz case
therefore brings into relief how inadequate our existing legal vocabulary and
doctrine are to address prosecutorial behavior that many intuitively find unfair
and improper. Indeed, the legal concept of "vindictive prosecution" is an
essentially useless analytic tool in its current form. It fails to capture much
of the behavior that we might properly want the law to name and shame with
that label.
The current state of affairs also invites reflection on whether plea
bargaining ought to be more closely policed and, if so, how. In three recent
cases,14 responding to contemporary scholarship about plea bargaining and
coercive prosecutorial power, the Supreme Court has attempted to regulate the
-prosecut-n_2488653.html (arguing that "[w]e have too many laws" and that "[e]very new
criminal law gives prosecutors more power"). This accretion of discretion and power is
difficult to reverse.
For instance, even when the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory, thus
theoretically requiring uniform federal sentencing outcomes, federal prosecutors would
often engage in "fact bargaining," charging the defendant with the possession of a lesser
quantity of drugs than he actually had in order to produce a lower sentence. See, e.g.,
Douglas A. Berman, Is Fact Bargaining Undermining the Sentencing Guidelines?, 8 FED. SENT'G
REP. 300 (1996); Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of
Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REv. 293, 297 (2005); Felicia Sarner, "Fact Bargaining"
Under the Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of the Probation Department, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 328
(1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period,
91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284, 1285 (1997).
12. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 4; David Boeri, Retired Federal Judge Joins Criticism over Handling
of Swartz Case, 9o.9WBUR (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.wbur.org/2o13/o1/16/gertner
-criticizes-ortiz-swartz (quoting retired Massachusetts federal judge Nancy Gertner as
criticizing U.S. Attorney Cameron Ortiz's "bad judgment" and as critiquing the prosecutor's
"enormous power to make you plead guilty and give up your rights"); Timothy B. Lee,
Aaron Swartz and the Corrupt Practice of Plea Bargaining, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2013, 12:50
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/oi/17/aaron-swartz-and-the-corrupt
-practice-of-plea-bargaining.
13. See, e.g., Scott H. Greenfield, Bringing Reality to Bear on the Aaron Swartz Tragedy, SIMPLE
JUSTICE (Jan. 17, 2013), http://blog.simplejustice.us/2ol3/oi/i7/bringing-reality-to-bear-on
-the-aaron-swartz-tragedy; Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz
(Part 2: Prosecutorial Discretion), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013, 11:34
PM), http://www.vololh.com/2o3/ol/16/the-criminal-charges-against-aaron-swartz-part
-2-prosecutorial-discretion.
14. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
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market for pleas." Its chosen route for doing so has been the defendant's right
to the effective assistance of counsel. That right safeguards the "fundamental
fairness" of the proceedings, ensuring a level of reliability sufficient to sustain
"confidence in the outcome." 6 The underlying premise of the Court's recent
intervention into plea bargaining, therefore, is that some bargained-for pleas
may be "bad" or "false" outcomes unworthy of confidence. But it is not at all
clear that imposing obligations on defense lawyers, retrospectively enforced on
post-conviction review, is the best way to avoid "bad" bargains. The Court's
recent doctrinal innovation in this area should prompt us to ask which actors
are best positioned to establish and enforce norms of what constitutes a "good"
or "true" bargain. 1
The inadequacy of the way the law currently talks about "vindictiveness"
and the recent doctrinal and scholarly ferment about plea bargaining give rise
to this Note's two related projects.
The first is to explain why "vindictive prosecution" came to have the
particularized, unusual, and ultimately unhelpful meaning that it does. To that
end, I present new research about the origins and development of the doctrine
of vindictive prosecution. Most scholarship on vindictive prosecution is
relatively old and highly doctrinal.'8 The story newly told here is, I hope,
15. See, e.g., Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992), and citing Rachel E. Barkow,
Separation ofPowers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (20o6)); Lafler, 132 S.
Ct. at 1387 (citing Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea Bargaining Market: From Caveat
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 1117, 1138 (2011)).
16. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 696 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARv.
L. REV. 150, 163-73 (2012) (contending that Lafler and Frye will promote better informal
practices to improve plea bargaining); Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from
Santobello to Padilla: A Response to Professor Bibas, 2 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 67 (2011),
http://www.califomialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Circuit/BowersFINAL.pdf (calling for the
Court "to constitutionally police not only the fairness of plea procedures but also the substance
of pleas"); Adam N. Stern, Note, Plea Bargaining, Innocence, and the Prosecutor's Duty to "Do
Justice," 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1039-40 (2012) (arguing that prosecutors' duties
under the Model Rules should constrain the terms and availability of plea bargains). This
point draws on comments made by Judith Resnik at the Yale Law Journal's Symposium on
Gideon v. Wainwright in March 2013.
i8. See, e.g., C. Peter Erlinder & David C. Thomas, Prohibiting Prosecutorial Vindictiveness While
Protecting Prosecutorial Discretion: Toward a Principled Resolution of a Due Process Dilemma, 76
J.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 341 (1985) (providing detailed analysis of the major Supreme Court
vindictiveness cases and their elaboration in the lower courts); Barbara A. Schwartz, The
Limits of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 69 IowA L. REv. 127 (1983) (same); Pamela Johns,
Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in Criminal Trials: Appellate Review of Vindictive Prosecution
Claims, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 373 (1982) (discussing interlocutory appeals of denials of
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interesting in its own right. It may help to illuminate the unpredictable
circumstances that shape Supreme Court doctrine and, as a result, the lives
governed by it.19 More purposefully, I aim to dispel the notion that the law's
equation of "vindictive" with "retaliation for the exercise of a legally protected
right, other than the right to a jury trial" ought to be seen as unimpeachable
precedent. And, most important, I hope that excavating the development of the
doctrine can help us understand why it did not work and how it might become
relevant again.
The Note's second project, then, is to rehabilitate the legal concept of
"vindictive prosecution" in hopes of contributing to current debate and
doctrinal development about prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining, and
excessive punishment. Intervening in the ongoing discussion and responding
to the Supreme Court's recent efforts, I offer a new proposal. I suggest that
reviving some parts of the old vindictive prosecution doctrine while shedding
some of its unnecessary strictures can produce a useful framework for policing
discretion, fairness, and leverage in the plea bargaining process.
I argue that the idea of vindictive prosecution as retaliation for the exercise
of a legal right was a poorly conceived accident from the beginning. It grew out
of a case meant to be about something else, and it failed to negotiate the
fundamental tension between encouraging plea bargaining and honoring the
right to trial. Vindictive prosecution doctrine was unstable because it reflected a
Court lurching from one pole to another -from glorifying process values with
little regard for practical consequences, to protecting plea bargaining at almost
any cost to the right to trial -without working to stake out a middle ground. I
identify such a middle ground and attempt to revitalize the legal concept of
vindictive prosecution motions); Gil A. Karson, Note, Federal Interlocutory Appeal of
Vindictive Prosecution Claims, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 485 (1982) (same); Nancy Rader
Whitehead, Note, Evaluating Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Claims in Non-Plea Bargained Cases,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133 (1982) (surveying vindictiveness claims in state and lower courts).
Notable exceptions to this general rule include Melodie Bales, Opening the Umbrella: The
Expansion of the Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Doctrine in United States v. Jenkins, 59 CATH. U.
L. REv. 855 (2010), which discusses in detail the implications of a recent Ninth Circuit
vindictiveness case and argues against its holding; Note, Breathing New Life into Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2074 (2001), which argues that, because of
changing social, political, and legal conditions, stronger protections against vindictiveness
are needed now to achieve the same effect that the old protections had when they were
created; and Murray Garnick, Note, Two Models ofProsecutorial Vindictiveness, 17 GA. L. REv.
467 (1983), which posits two conceptual models of vindictiveness, one concerned with due
process and a defendant's apprehension of the prosecutor's motive, and the other with crime
control and a prosecutor's actual motive.
ig. See generally Neal Devins, Better Lucky than Good, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 33 (2004) (describing the
role of fortuitous events in major case outcomes).
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vindictiveness in a way that negotiates the tension between pleas and trials. In
particular, I argue that an updated vindictive prosecution standard prohibiting
prosecutors from punishing the defendant's exercise of the right to a trial as a
wrong would be responsive to salient problems in today's criminal justice
system. It may not be an ideal solution, but it suggests that it is possible to
address important and competing objectives -imposing boundaries on
prosecutorial discretion, valuing the constitutional right to trial, and
permitting efficient bargains - in minimally disruptive fashion.
This argument proceeds in two parts.
Part I tells the story of how vindictive prosecution doctrine came to be. Its
erratic path reflects the fundamental tension between venerating the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial and coherently regulating a system designed to
discourage its exercise. Section L.A presents background on the practice and
law of plea bargaining. Section I.B discusses vindictiveness doctrine's origins in
another context. Section I.C discusses the Court's hasty and unthinking
application of vindictiveness to prosecutorial conduct, while Section I.D
explains its retreat.
Part II contends that the idea of vindictive prosecution could prove newly
useful in regulating prosecutorial discretion while both genuinely respecting
and formally venerating the right to trial. Section II.A discusses existing
scholarship and doctrine addressing the regulation of the plea-bargaining
market. I argue that the Court is moving toward, but has not yet effectively
imposed, constraints on prosecutors' ability to drive an exceptionally harsh
bargain. Section II.B argues for the merits of a new standard prohibiting
prosecutors from acting with the subjective intent to punish the defendant's
exercise of his right to trial, rather than merely with the goal or effect of
deterring it. A conclusion follows.
For a brief period during the 1970s, "it appeared that 'vindictive
prosecution' claims would be both common and successful."2 o Today, such
claims are "rarely made and even more rarely succeed."' But the history is
worth understanding and the concept worth renewing.
I. THE ACCIDENTAL DOCTRINE AND ITS UNDERLYING TENSIONS
In 1974, the Supreme Court held that a defendant must be free to exercise
his statutory and constitutional rights "without apprehension that the State
1021
20. RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 983 (3d ed. 2011).
21. Id.
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will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one."" The
Constitution requires that he be free of this apprehension even if the state has
no "actual retaliatory motivation" in filing a higher charge."
This holding seems to pose an obvious problem: If a defendant must not
fear the possibility of higher charges in retaliation for his exercise of a legal
right, how could a prosecutor possibly bring a higher charge if the defendant
exercises his right to trial? How can the government use leverage to plea
bargain?
In 1978, the Court recognized this problem, asserting that, "in the 'give-
and-take' of plea bargaining," there simply could be "no . . . element of
punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the
prosecution's offer."' In unsatisfying fashion, it eviscerated the doctrine it had
just created, effectively excepting the right to trial from those protected against
prosecutorial retaliation.
This Part explains the history of vindictive prosecution doctrine. It begins
with necessary background. Section L.A quickly explains the roots of plea
bargaining law and practice in the United States. Section I.B then discusses the
cases in which the idea of "vindictiveness" originated. In Section I.C, I tell the
previously untold story of how the Court stumbled into the new doctrine of
prosecutorial vindictiveness in hasty and ill-considered fashion, apparently due
in large part to North Carolina's bungled management of the key case. I then
explain in Section I.D how the Court responded to the practical consequences
of its decision by swinging back to the other extreme -expansively protecting
plea bargaining while failing to engage intellectually with the pressure it placed
on the right to trial.
The instability of the doctrine reflects the tension between enabling orderly
plea bargaining and protecting the constitutional right to jury trial. The
Court's foundational efforts in this area of law failed to look for, let alone find,
a middle ground to reasonably accommodate these competing interests.
A. A Note on the Development ofPlea Bargaining
To provide context for the argument that follows, this Section offers a very
short primer on the development of American plea bargaining and the relevant
22. Blacldedge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974).
23. Id.
24. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
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law. The purpose is to make clear that the current plea-dominated system has
deep historical roots and that plea bargaining's practical importance should
have been clear to the Supreme Court when prosecutorial vindictiveness first
came before it.
Well before the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution, the rising
crime rates of the 196os and 1970s, or the increasing political salience of crime
and public demand for law-and-order policies, plea bargaining was widespread
in the United States.
John Langbein has explained that, through roughly the eighteenth century,
the jury trial was a summary proceeding; as professional prosecution and the
law of evidence developed in the nineteenth century, jury trials became
resource-intensive affairs, and guilty pleas became an attractive alternative.26
By the early twentieth century, a plea was the most typical means of conviction.
In Manhattan and Brooklyn, for instance, eighty-five to ninety percent of
felony convictions were obtained by plea in the early 1920S.1 7 A number of
cities established crime commissions and conducted studies in the 192os,
finding, to the "remarkable surprise" of many, that the overwhelming majority
of convictions were obtained by plea." This system remained in place in the
intervening decades. In 1967, the President's crime commission similarly
estimated that "as many as 90 percent" of defendants in some jurisdictions
were convicted by plea. 9
But, for virtually all of this time, plea bargaining was a kind of open legal
secret, dominating the day-to-day administration of criminal justice without
any formal recognition that it complied with the Constitution. In the late
1950s, it was very possible that the practice of negotiating to induce pleas
might be declared entirely illegal. In 1957, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of
25. In the nation's seventy-five largest urban counties, about ninety-five percent of convictions
are obtained by guilty plea. See Thomas H. Cohen & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants
in Large Urban Counties, 2oo6, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content
/pub/pdf/fdluco6.pdf (last updated July 5, 2010).
26. See John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 261 (1979). Langbein also contends that "the weak, elective American trial bench"
preferred pleas, rather than bench trials, as the cost-saving alternative to jury trials, in order
to shield itself from the "moral responsibility for adjudication and from the political liability
of unpopular decisions." Id. at 270.
27. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18 (1979).
28. See id. at 26-29.
29. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE PROBLEM OF CRIME
IN A FREE SOCIETY 134 (1967); see also DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TIUAL 3 (Frank J. Remington ed.,
1966) (noting that " [r]oughly 90 per cent of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty").
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Appeals held that plea bargains induced by prosecutorial promises of any kind
were unlawful, only to be reversed by a three-to-two vote of the en banc
court.30 In an unusual move that may have been designed to prevent the
Supreme Court from pronouncing unfavorably on the legality of plea
bargaining, the Solicitor General admitted that the defendant's plea had been
in error, making the case moot." Later, in 1969, the Court hardly seemed
sanguine about the idea of negotiating pleas: "[A] plea of guilty is more than
an admission of conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, incomprehension,
coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect
cover-up of unconstitutionality."
In 1970, however, the Court explicitly acknowledged the "mutuality of
advantage" that pleas offer the defendant and the government: the defendant
"limit[s] the probable penalty" and can begin to serve his sentence
immediately, while the state conserves "scarce judicial and prosecutorial
resources" and "may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment" by
imposing it swiftly." The Court conceded that plea bargaining's prevalence
and practicality did not necessarily make it constitutional -but then found it
constitutional for essentially those reasons anyway. "[W]e cannot hold that it
is unconstitutional," the majority wrote in Brady v. United States, "for the State
to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to
the State . . . ."3 Even though the defendant in Brady would have faced the
death penalty if he did not accept the prosecutor's offer, the Court found that
the prosecutorial inducement was insufficient to compromise the "voluntary"
and "intelligent[]" nature of the plea." Thus, alongside its companion cases
limiting collateral review, 6 Brady established that the use of prosecutorial
leverage to extract pleas from defendants was fundamentally permissible.
30. Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d ioi, 113 (5th Cir. 1957), judgment set aside, 246 F.2d 571
(1957) (en banc), rev'd per curiam on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
31. Alschuler, supra note 27, at 36.
32. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (footnote omitted). Boykin held that due
process requires a showing that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. The case involved a
black defendant in Alabama who pled guilty to five counts of common law robbery-a
capital offense at the time-and was sentenced to death. It seems fair to speculate that
concerns about racial oppression and coercion in Southern state courts may have motivated
Boykin's skepticism about plea bargaining.
33. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S- 742, 752 (1970).
34. Id. at 753.
35. See id. at 756-57.
36. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970).
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There were some good reasons for the Court to finally bless plea bargaining
in this period. First, the skyrocketing crime rates of the 196os" had produced
more cases, and the emergence of crime as a high-salience political issue had
led to an expansion of both substantive criminal law and policing, which, in
turn, led to even more cases." And second, the expanded procedural
protections recently granted to defendants increased the number of issues to be
litigated at trial and made it more difficult and costly for the government to
prevail. 9 In Los Angeles, for instance, the average length of a criminal trial
more than doubled between 1964 and 1968.40 As a result, with massive
caseloads and higher costs-and without a commensurate injection of
resources -plea bargaining became, even more so than in the past, the only
way to obtain convictions and keep the system functioning.4'
Thus, while plea bargaining had long been the norm, it was even more of a
necessity by the mid-1970s. As the story of prosecutorial vindictiveness will
show, however, the Court was hardly consistent in keeping its practical
importance in mind.
37. See Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics: One Year of Data, FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State
/RunCrimeOneYearofData.cfm. There were 288,460 violent crimes in the U.S. in 1960 and
738,820 in 1970, while the population increased from about 179 million to about 203
million. Id.
38. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 216-43 (2011);
James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, ATLANTIC, May 1972,
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/crime/crimewar.htm ("[T]he [crime] figures for
the last five years of the sixties have convinced all but the most skeptical that something
more ominous than population changes or reporting errors is involved.. . . In the past five
years self-protection has become the dominant concern of those in our cities and suburbs
. . . ."), See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 75-110
(2007) (discussing the consequences of the tough-on-crime approach of the second half of
the twentieth century). New York's "Rockefeller drug laws" -a 1973 scheme of mandatory
minimum sentences for drug crimes that may have been motivated at least in part by the
national political ambitions of then-Governor Nelson Rockefeller-may be the most
notorious example of the pattern I am discussing. See Brian Mann, The Drug Laws that
Changed How We Punish, NPR, Feb. 14, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2o13/o2/14/1718226o8
/the-drug-laws-that-changed-how-we-punish.
3g. See Alschuler, supra note 27, at 38-40.
40. Id. at 38.
41. See William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of
Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 363-64 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 20o6).
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B. The Idea of Vindictiveness
The seeds of prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine were planted on Chief
Justice Warren's last day on the bench, when the Court handed down its
decision in North Carolina v. Pearce. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court
addressed two instances in which a judge had imposed a heavier sentence on a
defendant who was retried for the same crime after successfully appealing his
first conviction. Relying on the principle that the state may not impose
unlawful conditions upon or penalize the exercise of constitutional rights,
Pearce held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "requires
that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first
conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial."43
Furthermore, the Court found that, "since the fear of such vindictiveness may
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or
collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a
defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part
of the sentencing judge."" Pearce therefore established a presumption of
vindictiveness when a judge imposed a harsher sentence the second time
around after a defendant successfully challenged his initial conviction.'
In follow-up cases, the Court declined to apply the Pearce rule where a
different judge or jury imposed the harsher subsequent sentence.46 The Court
reasoned that the second sentencing authority would have no "personal stake"
in vindicating the initial decision by penalizing the defendant for appealing it,
so there was no need for a presumption of vindictiveness. 47 One such case,
Colten v. Kentucky, 48 addressed Kentucky's two-tiered justice system for
misdemeanors, which enabled a person convicted in a limited-jurisdiction
inferior court to receive a de novo trial in a higher court. The Court similarly
noted that there would be no particular reason for the second judge, who was
simply making a fresh determination of guilt or innocence, to punish the
42. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
43. Id. at 725.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 726.
46. E.g., Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
47. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 27.
48. 407 U.S. 104.
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defendant for his dissatisfaction with the first verdict.4 9 As such, a presumption
of vindictiveness was unwarranted in a two-tiered system enabling de novo
retrial as of right.
Pearce and Colten did not discuss whether the government's desire to punish
the defendant for seeking a new trial could violate due process. In fact, these
cases seem to have left the question open. On the one hand, the state might
have a "stake" in penalizing the defendant for trying to undo its success in the
first proceeding. And, as Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent in Colten, the
Pearce rule aimed to address the "inherent ... danger" that the risk of a higher
penalty could deter a defendant from exercising his right to appeal--a risk just
as present from the government's conduct as from the judge's.so On the other
hand, nothing in Pearce or Colten spoke directly to prosecutorial behavior at all.
And the government's attempt to seek a higher sentence on retrial might not be
"vindictive" in the same fashion as a judge's imposition of higher sentence on
retrial. It was the court's prior decision - not the state's - that the defendant
had successfully appealed, so the judge would have a more personal motive
than the prosecutor to get back at the defendant out of spite.
Against this doctrinal backdrop, the problems posed by as-of-right de novo
retrials soon returned to the Court.
C. From Blackledge ...
The best explanation for the doctrine of vindictive prosecution may be that
Blackledge v. Perry,s the case that created it, was simply not supposed to be
about vindictiveness at all,
1. Waiver
North Carolina prisoner Jimmy Seth Perry had been convicted of
misdemeanor assault for his role in a jailhouse fight and had received a six-
month sentence from a court of limited jurisdiction that handled misdemeanor
cases.52 Perry was entitled by North Carolina statute to a de novo trial in a
higher court. When he filed his notice to seek one, the prosecutor charged him,
49. See id. at 116-17 ("We note first the obvious: that the court which conducted Colten's trial
and imposed the final sentence was not the court with whose work Colten was sufficiently
dissatisfied to seek a different result on appeal ..
50. Id. at 126 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
52. Id. at 22.
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on the same factual basis, with felony assault with intent to kill and inflict
serious bodily injury." Perry pled guilty to felony assault and received a longer
sentence.54
After he had pled to the felony, Perry filed a habeas petition, which the
district court eventually granted on the basis of double jeopardy, which was at
issue because of the two-tiered criminal court system. It found that "double
jeopardy is involved when a defendant is subjected to prosecution for a greater
offense upon trial de novo in a higher Court, after appeal from a lower
Court."ss The district court reasoned that the state should only have one initial
opportunity to bring the higher charge, lest the initial misdemeanor trial
function as "little more than a proving ground" for the state's felony case."
The state also argued that Perry had waived his constitutional protection
against double jeopardy by pleading guilty, but the district court rejected this
argument. Double jeopardy, it found, is a "fundamental right" that could not
be implicitly waived by a guilty plea because it "goes to the power of a Court to
try a person."" That is, double jeopardy could not be waived by a plea because
it undermined the very jurisdiction of the court that had entered the plea. The
Fourth Circuit summarily affirmed. 8
Thus, when Blackledge arrived at the Supreme Court, it was almost entirely
about double jeopardy, and the litigants and the Court were focused on the
issue of waiver. North Carolina's petition for certiorari presented only two
questions for review, addressing double jeopardy and waiver." The Supreme
Court had recently held that a defendant who pled guilty could only challenge
the voluntary and intelligent character of his plea, and not any independent
constitutional violations that may have preceded it, in a federal habeas
petition. 6o But there was a pre-existing split in the federal courts of appeals
over whether double jeopardy could be waived like any other constitutional
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id.
55. Perry v. Blackledge, No. 2800 Civil (E.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 1972) (citing Wood v. Ross, 434 F.2d
297 (4 th Cir. 1970)), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. C at 12, 17, Blackledge,
417 U.S. 21 (No. 72-1660).
56. Id. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 19.
58. Perry v. Blackledge, 475 F.2d 1400 (4th Cir. 1973) (unpublished table decision).
5g. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 2 (presenting two questions: "Is double
jeopardy a non-jurisdictional matter which is waived by a voluntary and intelligent plea of
guilty?" and "Must a defendant be specifically advised that a guilty plea waives his right to
contest double jeopardy?").
6o. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
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claim antecedent to a plea, or whether, as the Fourth Circuit thought, it was
different because it went to the validity of the underlying indictment itself.6'
Thus, the Court had a good reason to take Perry's case: to determine whether
double jeopardy claims fell within its new rule preventing collateral review of
constitutional claims that were independent of otherwise valid guilty pleas.
The Court apparently took the case for this purpose. When the conference
discussed the petition on October 1, 1973, six Justices voted to grant certiorari,
presumably to vacate the Fourth Circuit's summary order; the liberal group of
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall voted to deny it.6 ' The only question,
it seemed, was how far the Court should go in rolling back Perry's successful
double jeopardy claim. The Justices favoring certiorari seemed to be split over
whether to remand on the waiver issue in light of new precedent, reverse the
Fourth Circuit on waiver, or find that there had been no double jeopardy
violation at all.6 3
The outcome seemed clear. One law clerk predicted:
This case is undoubtedly going to have to be vacated and remanded.
The task of the conference will be to decide what instructions to give
the lower courts on remand - simply to clarify the impact of a guilty
plea [on waiver of constitutional claims] or to in addition speak to what
the [district court] said about substantive constitutional issues.64
2. Stumbling into Vindictiveness
Ultimately, however, the Court declined to decide the double jeopardy
questions. Applying Pearce, it instead sided with Perry on the ground that "the
indictment on the felony charge constituted a penalty for exercising his
61. See Memorandum from Jack Owens, Law Clerk, to Justice Lewis Powell (July 30, 1973), in
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers: No. 72-166o, Blackledge v. Perry, WASH. & LEE UNIv. 1, 2,
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%2oarchives/72-166o BlackledgePerry.pdf (last
visited Nov. 14, 2013).
62. Notes from Conference (Oct. 1, 1973), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 61, at to, lo.
63. Id. Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist seemed to take the same basic view, arguing,
respectively, that the Court should summarily reverse the Fourth Circuit on the basis of
Tollett or should remand the case for reconsideration in light of Tollett. Justice White, who
had initially put the case on the list for discussion, seemed to think that the Court should
find that there was no double jeopardy at all -even though North Carolina did not contest
the issue in its petition.
64. Supplemental Memorandum from Jack Owens, Law Clerk, to Justice Lewis Powell (Sept.
25, 1973), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 61, at 6, 9.
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statutory right to appeal, and thus contravened the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 6s
The conference did an about-face when it met on February 22, 1974, three
days after hearing argument. Justices Stewart and White, who had been
inclined to reverse on the issue of double jeopardy but divided over how to do
so, now argued for affirming the Fourth Circuit by finding a due process
violation.66 Justice Stewart described this as an "odd-ball" case, arguing that
there had been no double jeopardy violation but that the defendant had a right
not to be "hailed [sic] into higher court on an increased charge" because doing
so would burden his right to appeal.' Justices White, Blackmun, and Marshall
agreed that the case should be resolved on due process rather than double
jeopardy grounds.6 8
So why would the Court use Perry's "odd-ball" case to extend the judicial
vindictiveness rule from Pearce to prosecutorial conduct? It seems to have done
so because North Carolina blundered into conceding the point at oral
argument, which Assistant Attorney General Richard League handled for the
state. In his handwritten notes from the bench, Justice Powell faulted League's
"hopelessly weak" presentation. 69 League, who began by apologizing for the
"shabby condition" in which his brief had arrived,7 o seemed not to contemplate
the possibility that the state was vulnerable to a due process argument on the
ground that the higher charge had retaliated against Perry's exercise of a
legal right.
When Justice Marshall asked if Perry could have been indicted for a felony
if he had not appealed, League answered that he could not have.' Marshall
immediately followed by asking, "So, because he appealed, he was indicted?"
6s. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25 (1974). Justices Rehnquist and Powell both sided with
the petitioner on the ground that Perry had waived his constitutional claims by pleading
guilty, see id. at 35-37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), while only Justice Rehnquist took issue
with the Court's vindictiveness analysis, see id. at 32-35.
66. See Justice Lewis Powell, Notes from Conference (Feb. 22, 1974), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Papers, supra note 61, at 14, 15 (noting that Chief Justice Burger "said he thought he would
join Stewart & White").
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Justice Lewis Powell, Notes from Oral Argument (Feb. 19, 1974), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Papers, supra note 61, at 12, 12.
70. Oral Argument at 00:45-00:48, Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (No. 72-1660),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_72 i66o.
71. Id. at 12:10-12:18.
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Remarkably, League answered, "I would say so, yes sir."7 ' An audible snicker
and an exclamation of "Thank you!" from an unknown party can be heard on
the recording of the painful four-second silence that followed.7 1 Perhaps
belatedly realizing the significance of his admission, League attempted damage
control, saying, "But I would not attach to it perhaps the same significance to it
as Your Honor. This well could have been an event where they tried to get it
out of the way down below."74 It is unclear what he meant by this second
sentence; a new question changed the subject as he trailed off.75 Justice
Marshall later read from the transcript of oral argument to support his position
in conference that the Pearce vindictiveness rule applied to this case.76
Perry's counsel advanced his vindictiveness claim in relatively cursory
fashion in his brief, and only in the context of a larger argument about double
jeopardy.' The State essentially failed to discuss it at all; its one reference to
Pearce was tangential.78 When offered the opportunity at oral argument to
engage with Perry's vindictiveness claim, League had only a weak response.
League had been arguing that Perry had received a reduced sentence in
exchange for his guilty plea to the felony charge, suggesting that his plea was
knowing and intelligent and should have waived Perry's constitutional claims.
Chief Justice Burger then asked: "Does that bring you up against the Pearce
case, about increasing sentences in any way?" 7 9 League replied haltingly: "No,
sir. I don't think Pearce is applicable to this case, by virtue of what was said in
the Colten decision that the possibility of vindictive punishment does not occur
sufficiently within the two-tier system to warrant the imposition of the
prophylactic rule in Pearce."so
This was an accurate description of the holding in Colten, but it only
applied to the possibility of vindictiveness by a different judge than the one
72. Id, at 12:19-12:23.
73. Id. at 12:23-12:27.
74. Id. at 12:27-12:37.
75. Id. at 12:39-12:45.
76. See Powell, Notes from Conference, supra note 66.
77. See Brief for Respondent at 16, Blacldedge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (No. 72-1660), 1974
WL 185591, at *16 (arguing that Pearce's due process concerns "converge" with Perry's
double jeopardy claim).
78. See Brief for Petitioners at 3 n.1, Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21 (No. 72-1660), 1974 WL 185590, at *3
n.1.
79. Oral Argument, supra note 70, at 16:oi-16:o6.
8o. Id. at 16:06-16:28; see supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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who had initially heard the case before appeal.8' League evidently failed to
grasp that the logic of Pearce could potentially be extended to encompass a
prosecutor's behavior.' Justice Stewart did just that in his majority opinion,
finding that "the opportunities for vindictiveness in this situation are such as to
impel the conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analogous to that
of the Pearce case."" Prosecutors who seek to conserve resources have an
incentive to discourage persons convicted of misdemeanors from obtaining
new trials."' If they are permitted to increase the charge, they will be able to
"insure that only the most hardy defendants" will exercise their right.8 s
And yet, just as League failed to realize that the Court might extend Pearce
to prosecutors, the Court itself seemed not to recognize that this extension
would implicate the practice of plea bargaining. Indeed, the majority only
broached the topic of plea bargaining to explain why Perry had not waived his
claim. Perry had been denied due process by the "very initiation of the
proceedings against him," the Court argued, so he could not forfeit his due
process claim by pleading guilty to a charge that was unconstitutionally
brought to begin with.8 6 Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, meanwhile,
chided the majority for discouraging prosecutors from offering "plea
bargains."" Permitting defendants to challenge guilty pleas on collateral
review, he reasoned, would undermine the finality of pleas and therefore
reduce prosecutors' incentives to bargain for them.8 8 In a separate dissent that
Justice Powell drafted but ultimately decided not to publish, he expressed a
similar view that "the efficacious administration of justice demands that guilty
pleas, made voluntarily and with the advice of counsel, be respected as a
definitive resolution of antecedent issues."89 But none of the discussion of plea
bargaining dealt with the effect of the vindictive prosecution rule itself. The
record simply reflects no awareness of the policy consequences of the decision.
The Court's resolution of Blackledge was therefore not only unexpected, but
also inadequate for failing to anticipate the difficulties it would soon create. We
81. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
82. See supra text accompanying note So.
83. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 28.
86. Id. at 30-31.
87. Id. at 37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8s. See id.
89. Justice Lewis Powell, Draft of Dissenting Opinion (May 1o, 1974), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Papers, supra note 61, at 61, 62.
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can only speculate whether the former caused the latter. Of course, there is a
reason why the Court has the parties brief and argue the questions it considers,
and we might reasonably hypothesize that more thorough consideration would
have alerted the Justices to this issue.9o We might also wonder why the Court
did not choose to set the case for reargument, which it occasionally does when
it anticipates that it may decide the case on different grounds than the parties
initially contemplated.9 1 There is no way to know whether better preparation
would have helped the Court foresee the problems that plea bargaining would
cause for its new extension of vindictiveness doctrine to prosecutors. But it
seems fair to conclude that the Court cannot have improved the quality of its
reasoning by abruptly changing course.
In the end, then, the Court's decision in Blackledge created, in response to
the contingencies of this "odd-ball case," a new and undertheorized
constitutional rule that the Court had not originally intended to develop.
Justice Stewart explained from the bench: "We agree with the Court of Appeals
that it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for the State to up the
ante after the respondent appealed his original misdemeanor conviction."92
Left wholly unconsidered was whether it would also violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to up the ante after the defendant went to trial.
D. ... To Bordenkircher
Four years later, the Court confronted a case in which the prosecutor's
behavior seemed indistinguishable from that in Blackledge- except that the
defendant had invoked a constitutional rather than a statutory right, which
should only have strengthened his claim. Instead, the pendulum swung back to
the other extreme, as the Court, faced with a conflict of its own maling, gutted
its protection of the right to trial in an effort to protect plea bargaining.
go. See Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral
Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, oo AM. POL. Scl. REv. 99 (2006) (finding that the
quality of oral argument affects decisional outcomes).
91. See, e.g., Valerie Hoekstra & Timothy Johnson, Delaying Justice: The Supreme Court's Decision
to Hear Rearguments, 56 POL. REs. Q.351, 351 (2003) (explaining the conditions under which
the Court sets cases for reargument to resolve uncertainty); Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to Be
Expanded and Reargued, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/2o2/03/ldobel-to-be-reargued. Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), are among the seminal cases that have been argued twice.
Hoekstra & Johnson, supra, at 351.
92. Opinion Announcement at 1:22, Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21 (No. 72-1660), http://www.oyez
.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973-72_166o.
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Blackledge generated a modest immediate response. The most extensive
initial scholarly discussion focused on the holding that Perry, despite pleading
guilty, did not waive his double jeopardy and due process claims.9 3 But
Blackledge did lead to a wide variety of vindictive prosecution claims in the
following years. Some closely followed its model, challenging a prosecutor's
decision to bring more severe charges after a defendant successfully appealed
his initial conviction.9 4 Some shifted into the pretrial context, arguing that a
prosecutor could not bring higher charges in an effort to achieve a particular
outcome before trial.9 s These attempts to bring a range of vindictive
prosecution claims, and the fact that the Blackledge opinion offered little
additional guidance on what constituted a "realistic likelihood of
'vindictiveness,'"96 led some to conclude that the new rule of vindictive
prosecution was "difficult to apply."97
93. See, e.g., Robert N. Shwartz, Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of "Present but Unknowable"
Constitutional Rights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1454-63
(1974). Some commentators also noted a blind spot in its protection of defendants who had
successfully appealed their convictions: they could not face a higher charge on retrial, but
prosecutors who had previously dismissed a charge in exchange for a now-vacated plea
might be able to prosecute the higher charge. See Paul D. Borman, The Chilled Right to
Appeal from a Plea Bargain Conviction: A Due Process Cure, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 663, 669-70,
689-94 (1974); Virgil L. Roth, Note, "Upping the Ante" Against the Defendant Who
Successfully Attacks His Guilty Plea: Double Jeopardy and Due Process Implications, 5o NOTRE
DAME LAW. 857, 874-76 (1975).
94. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (sth Cir. 1977) (remanding for consideration of
a vindictive prosecution claim where the prosecutor charged additional counts after a
successful appeal, even though the defendant had received the same sentence); United
States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding vindictive prosecution where the
defendant was re-indicted for first-degree murder after a mistrial on second-degree murder
charges, absent justification for the increase in the severity of the crime charged); People v.
McCutcheon, 368 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1977) (rejecting a vindictive prosecution claim where,
after the defendant's misdemeanor plea was vacated, the prosecutor reinstated the initial
felony indictment that had been dropped in exchange for the misdemeanor plea).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 ( 9th Cir. 1976) (finding the
appearance of vindictiveness when a felony charge was filed after the defendant exercised
the right to a jury trial rather than bench trial); United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505
(C.D. Cal. 1975) (dismissing indictments on additional charges after defendants exercised
their statutory right to be tried in their place of residence, because of the potential for
vindictiveness); see also Fielding v. LeFevre, 548 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1977) (raising a
vindictiveness claim where the trial judge, attempting to coax a guilty plea, had allegedly
threatened the defendant with a more severe sentence if he went to trial).
96. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27.
g. William T. Pizzi, Prosecutorial Discretion, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court's Opinion in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269, 284 (1979).
1034
123:1014 2014
VINDICATING VINDICTIVENESS
Paul Hayes was surely not the only defendant to claim vindictiveness when
a prosecutor brought more or higher charges after he declined to plead guilty.98
Hayes had been indicted on a felony charge of forging an $88.30 check and
faced two to ten years in prison.99 The prosecutor offered him a five-year
sentence and threatened that, if Hayes did not plead guilty, he would be
charged under Kentucky's Habitual Criminal Act and subject to a mandatory
life sentence because he had two prior felony convictions.' Hayes refused the
deal, the prosecutor increased the charge, and Hayes lost at trial and received a
life sentence.'
Hayes's federal habeas petition alleged that his "indictment and conviction
under the Habitual Criminal Statute was vindictively sought by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky in this case."' The district court was
unpersuaded. It easily identified the wide-ranging and, from its perspective,
undesirable practical implications of Hayes's argument: "If prosecutors were
precluded from seeking conviction of more serious offenses following the
rejection by defendants of the opportunity to plead guilty to lesser offenses, the
entire concept of plea bargaining would be effectively destroyed . .. ".'o Hayes
had stumbled into a confrontation with the unconsidered policy consequences
of Black edge.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's policy
analysis. While Kentucky "urges that the entire concept of plea bargaining will
be destroyed if prosecutors are not allowed to seek convictions on more serious
charges if defendants refuse to plead guilty," Judge McCree wrote, "[w]e do
not agree."'0 4 The court of appeals held that a prosecutor may "offer a
defendant concessions relating to prosecution under an existing indictment,"
i.e., drop some charges or reduce the sentence, in the course of plea
98. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 414 F. Supp. 394 (D. Conn. 1976).
g. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978).
ioo. Id. at 358-59.
1o. Id. at 359.
102. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Hayes v. Cowan, No. 75-61 (E.D. Ky. June 1i, 1975),
reprinted in Appendix at 59, Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357 (No. 76-1334). Oddly, the brief
supporting his petition, prepared by a local public defender, failed to cite Blackledge, but it
argued that the "blatantly vindictive" indictment violated Pearce. Memorandum in Support
of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Hayes, No. 75-61, reprinted in Appendix, supra, at 65.
1o3. Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, Hayes, No. 75-61, in Appendix, supra note 102, at
72-73. The magistrate's recommendation and report were adopted by the district court. See
Appendix, supra note 1o2, at 75.
104. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44 (6th Cir. 1976).
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negotiations."os By bringing the initial indictment, however, the prosecutor has
made a "discretionary determination that the interests of the state are served by
not seeking more serious charges."'o' If he were to increase the charges after
plea negotiations broke down, therefore, "a strong inference is created" that he
did so out of vindictiveness, since he had already determined that the lower
charge was appropriate."o7
Thus, the stakes of the case quickly crystallized. In light of the Court's
recent Brady line of decisions, which had finally blessed plea bargaining as not
only practically necessary but legitimate,os could the practice be sustained if
prosecutors could not penalize defendants' exercise of the right to trial? And, if
not, would it make a meaningful constitutional difference if prosecutors
initially brought higher charges and then enticed the defendant to forfeit his
right in exchange for a reduction, rather than adding higher charges to retaliate
against the defendant for exercising it? Or, as Kentucky bluntly and
pragmatically framed the issue:
This case involves a current bargaining practice used in plea
discussions. . . . [T]he realit[y] of plea discussions involving charges
unbrought but legally susceptible of being brought is that it is entirely
appropriate, legally and constitutionally, for the prosecutor to offer the
accused not to seek indictments on the additional charges for a plea of
guilty to a charge already brought.
The inevitable effect of plea bargaining is to discourage the
assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter
the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial. o
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 44-45.
los. See supra Section I.A.
1og. Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (No. 76-1334), 1977
WL 18970o, at *5-6. At the merits stage, Kentucky and amici almost exclusively advanced
similar policy arguments. Indeed, Kentucky freely acknowledged that "[t]he whole practice
of plea bargaining is coercive," and argued that bringing a higher charge was qualitatively
no different than offering to heavily discount an initially high charge. Id. at 22, 1977 WL
189700, at *22. In its amicus brief, Texas warned that "[t]o uphold the decision of the Court
of Appeals would auger the complete demise of plea bargaining. The criminal justice
system, already stymied by an overly burdensome case load, would collapse under the
pressure of trial on each case without plea bargaining." Brief of Amicus Curiae [State of
Texas] in Support of Petitioner at 6, Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357 (No. 76-1334), 1977 WL
189708, at *6.
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Thus, Bordenkircher represented a collision between "two separate and
inherently conflicting lines of case law" -prohibiting prosecutorial
vindictiveness and establishing the legitimacy of plea bargaining."o But, given
the far broader practical significance of the latter, and the former's utter failure
to account for it, the real question was not which would prevail, but how
completely the Court would bend vindictive prosecution doctrine to meet the
needs of plea bargaining.
The answer: almost entirely. By a five-to-four vote, the Court rejected the
Sixth Circuit's distinction between offering to reduce a charge if the defendant
accepted a plea and threatening to increase a charge if the defendant refused a
plea. "As a practical matter," Justice Stewart explained, these two sequences
were "no different.""' Justice Blacknun, joined by Justices Marshall and
Brennan, endorsed the Sixth Circuit's sequencing rule in dissent. Arguing that
"[p]rosecutorial vindictiveness in any context is still prosecutorial
vindictiveness,"" Justice Blacknun conceded that, practically speaking, it may
"make[] little difference how this case, now that it is here, is decided.""'
Aggressive prosecutors might simply bring harsher indictments up front.
Nonetheless, Justice Blacimun thought it preferable as a policy matter to "hold
the prosecution to the charge it was originally content to bring and to justify in
the eyes of its public.""'
Justice Powell, meanwhile, struggled deeply with the case, which he found
"terribly unjust,""s and waffled on his position. He initially criticized the Sixth
Circuit's opinion on policy grounds, fearing that it would compel prosecutors
to indict for the maximum possible penalty, creating a larger gap to bridge
with defendants and thereby inhibiting plea bargaining."' At conference after
argument, he sided with the majority and voted to reinstate Hayes's
110. Christine Schaack McGoey, Note, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness and the Plea Bargaining
Exception: Bordenkircher v. Hayes Four Years Later, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. loll, loll (1982).
ill. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 360-61.
12. Id. at 368 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
113. Id. This has been described as a "remarkably candid" admission of the "meaninglessness" of
his own position. Stuntz, supra note 41, at 366.
114. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11s. Letter from Justice Lewis Powell to Justice Potter Stewart (Dec. 28, 1977) (on file in the
Justice Potter Stewart Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, Box 127, Folder
lo86).
116. Memorandum of Justice Lewis Powell at 4 (Sept. 14, 1977), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers: No.
76-1334, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, WASH. & LEE UNIV. 6, http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages
/powell%2oarchives/76-1334_BordenkircherHayes.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
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conviction. 117 He wrote in his handwritten notes that he agreed with Justice
Stewart, who had commented that " [p]lea bargaining, by definition, involved
'threats' as to consequences of not accepting a proposal. There may be a point
(deception, fraud) beyond which prosecutor may not go. But not here.",,,8
Ultimately, however, while noting that he "agree[d] with much of the Court's
opinion,"" Justice Powell dissented separately and argued that the prosecutor
in this "exceptional" case had acknowledged vindictiveness. 2 o Because it could
be inferred from the prosecutor's initial charging decision that he had "deemed
it unreasonable and not in the public interest" to subject Hayes to a life
sentence, this was the rare instance in which the scales of plea bargaining had
become "so unevenly balanced as to arouse suspicion."
The Bordenkircher result has been discussed by many commentators and
strongly criticized by some of them.' It is not my purpose to review the
criticism here, and the propriety of the habitual offender statute itself is
another matter entirely. But a couple of Bordenkircher's particular shortcomings
demonstrate just how wildly the Court swung the pendulum back in favor of
the practical imperatives of plea bargaining, while thoroughly discounting the
value of the trial right and the need to insulate its exercise from retaliation.
First, the majority's assertion that "in the 'give-and-take' of plea
bargaining, there is no. .. element of punishment or retaliation so long as the
accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer""' simply does not
withstand analytical scrutiny. For one thing, Perry was just as free not to
appeal as Hayes was not to plead guilty. And the defendant's ability to make a
voluntary choice cannot explain why there is no element of retaliation. That
two parties are engaged in a give-and-take negotiation does not preclude one
party from attempting to punish the other for walking away from the table.
The chance that both parties might benefit, moreover, has no logical bearing
117. Notes from Conference (Nov. 11, 1977), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 116, at 37,
39.
118. Id.
1ig. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 368 (Powell, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 372.
121. Id. at 371-72.
122. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 41, at 367-69 (explaining that the Court missed Hayes's "real
complaint," which was that he "was treated more harshly than others with worse records
than his" and "worse than he deserved"); Stephen F. Ross, Comment, Bordenkircher v.
Hayes: Ignoring Prosecutorial Abuses in Plea Bargaining, 66 CALiF. L. REv. 875, 875 (1978)
("The decision effectively removes plea bargaining from its constitutional premise: the
'mutuality of advantage' between the prosecutor and the defendant.").
123. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363.
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on whether one might act with retaliatory motive. It simply does not follow
from the fact that plea bargaining offers a "mutuality of advantage"'" that
there can be no "element of punishment or retaliation" by the prosecutor.
What the Court really seems to have meant is that, because plea bargaining
offers a mutuality of advantage to both parties, there is no reason to police it for
punishment or retaliation. Plea bargaining is a permissible practice, so the
prosecutor's desire to achieve a plea is a permissible motive for his
discretionary charging decision. The concern for the defendant's legally
protected right that animated Blackledge was simply absent from the equation
four years later.
Second, Bordenkircher underhandedly rejected Blackledge's basic view that a
defendant must be able to exercise his rights free from the fear of retaliation,
whether or not the prosecutor has an actual retaliatory motive.2 s Justice
Stewart reinterpreted the doctrine to "emphasize[]" that due process is not
violated simply by the "possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the
exercise of a legal right," but rather by the "danger that the State might be
retaliating against the accused."" 6 This is plainly not what Blackledge held.
Without explicitly acknowledging it, then, and without openly attempting to
reconcile the competing imperatives of protecting plea bargaining and
vindicating the importance of the right to trial, the Court essentially
abandoned the doctrine it had established several years before.
II. BRINGING VINDICTIVENESS BACK
So far, this Note has explained the accidental origins of vindictive
prosecution doctrine and - perhaps as a result of those origins - the doctrine's
failure to strike, or even seek, a balance between the practical necessity of plea
bargaining and the constitutional value of the jury trial. This underlying
tension between trial and plea remains vital today. Now, however, the pressing
question is not how to permit and recognize plea bargaining, but how to
constrain and regulate it. In this Part, I argue that the idea of vindictive
prosecution, understood in a way that more closely reflects what we ordinarily
mean by vindictiveness, could prove newly useful.
124. Id. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970)).
125. Blacldedge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974).
126. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363.
127. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28 (requiring that a defendant be "freed of apprehension of ...
retaliatory motivation" (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969))).
1039
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Section II.A explains recent doctrinal innovation about pleas. It argues that
the Court is seeking more and more to regulate plea bargaining and is
justifying its actions on the ground that trials are increasingly irrelevant. It has
come to view the terms of a "standard" plea to a given offense as the criminal
justice system's "true" outcome. Nonetheless, the Court has acted against a
backdrop of doctrine and constitutional values that still presume the
importance of the right to trial. As a result, the Court has only been able to
regulate plea bargaining indirectly and has not imposed any substantive limits
on prosecutorial discretion itself.
Section II.B proposes and defends a standard that would prohibit
prosecutors from acting with the intent of punishing a defendant's exercise of
his right to trial as a wrong. Enforced through an evidentiary presumption,
such a standard would allow for some substantive regulation of prosecutors'
charging discretion. But it would do so for the sake of protecting the right to
trial, not on the basis of its insignificance. Among other advantages, then, this
revitalized vindictive prosecution doctrine would partly reconcile the
competing values that the old vindictive prosecution doctrine could not
accommodate.
A. Regulating Pleas in an Administrative System
The Supreme Court has recently come around to the view that plea
bargaining "is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
justice system."'"8 The Court has consequently shown a greater inclination to
128. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note i5, at
1912). This conclusion is basically consistent with the view of a substantial body of
scholarship urging that pleas be treated as the legitimate norm rather than the begrudgingly
tolerated exception, and that some additional order be imposed on the plea-bargaining
process to check potentially coercive practices. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 15; Michael M.
O'Hear, The End of Bordenkircher: Extending the Logic of Apprendi to Plea Bargaining, 84
WASH. U. L. REv. 835 (2006); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2548 (2004). Some such scholarship has questioned
whether the criminal justice system can be meaningfully described as adversarial under
present conditions. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice,
66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2117 (1998); William T. Pizzi, The American "Adversary System"?, ioo
W. VA. L. REv. 847 (1998); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge
Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (2003). Roughly ninety-five percent of criminal
convictions are achieved by pleas. See Cohen & Kyckelhahn, supra note 25; Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics Online, UNIV. ALBANY tbl.5 .22.20o, http://www.albany.edu
/sourcebook/pdf/t 5222010.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (reporting 87,418 guilty pleas out
of 89,741 felony convictions in federal district court in 2010).
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regulate plea bargaining," 9 beyond the minimal requirements of the colloquy
in which the trial judge formally ratifies the previously negotiated
agreement.'30 In doing so, however, the Court has relied on a body of law
treating pleas as the exception even as it now declares pleas the rule. As a result,
recent developments in constitutional criminal procedure have only been able
to regulate plea bargaining through indirect means.
As I explain below, the Court has crafted these new rules of criminal
procedure on the assumption that there is something like a "standard" or
"correct" plea offer that a defendant ought to receive. It has deployed this
assumption to fairly modest effect, entitling a defendant to this "standard" deal
if his lawyer fails to inform him when he has been offered it or properly advise
him about whether he should accept it. But the Court has imposed no
obligation directly on the prosecutor to offer the standard deal-or even
something that remotely approximates it -in the first place. As I will go on to
argue in Section II.B, however, the assumption of the "standard" offer could
serve as the basis for a more robust rule that would constrain bad prosecutorial
behavior and reduce excessive discretion.
The Court began its innovation in Sixth Amendment doctrine with its 2010
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,"' holding that a defendant was denied the
effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to advise him that his
plea would result in his removal from the United States. That holding broke
new ground in making clear that a criminal defense attorney must attend to a
conviction's collateral consequences to fulfill her obligations to her client."' But
it also reflected a new willingness to tailor new procedural protections
specifically to plea bargaining.'
129. Bibas, supra note 17, at 151 ("The Court, like Rip Van Winkle, has at last awoken from its
long slumber and sees the vast field it has left all but unregulated."); Wesley M. Oliver, The
Present and Future of Plea Bargaining: A Look at Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper,
2012 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 257, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files
/supreme-court-review/2o12/9/scr-2012-oliver.pdf. But see Darryl K. Brown, Lafler, Frye,
and Our Still-Unregulated Plea Bargaining System, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 131, 131 (2012)
(arguing that "the Court's opinions suggest a need for greater regulation" of plea bargaining
but that its decisions "develop regulation of only a particularly limited sort").
130. See FED. R. CRIM. P. ii(b) (providing for plea colloquies).
131. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
132. See infra note 222.
133. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 15, at 1120 ("Padilla is the Court's first case to treat plea bargaining
as a subject worthy of constitutional regulation in its own right and on its own terms.").
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The 2012 companion cases of Missouri v. Frye14 and Lafler v. Cooper'3s went
further in imposing procedural order on the bargaining process. In Frye, a
defendant's attorney had failed to communicate plea offers that, if accepted,
probably would have resulted in a lower sentence than the defendant
ultimately received after accepting a later, harsher offer.' 6 In Lafler, the
defendant rejected a lenient plea offer on the faulty advice of his lawyer and
ultimately received a much longer sentence after being convicted at trial. 1 7 In
both, the Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
had been violated and that the defendant was entitled at least to the possibility
of resentencing and perhaps to the benefit of the earlier offer.'
Lafler and Frye rely on an implicit idea of a "standard" plea deal that a
defendant who engaged in certain conduct ought to be offered. As a logical
matter, it makes little sense to require that a defendant be given the benefit of
an erroneously forgone plea offer unless he was, in some sense, "supposed" to
receive that deal rather than the harsher one he ultimately got. The normative
force of the claim that plea bargaining "is the criminal justice system" is that a
typical plea made in the ordinary course of business - not the sentence imposed
by a judge after a jury trial - is the true outcome that the system aims to
produce. 3 9
Indeed, both cases explicitly rely on an understanding that the normal,
ordinary-course plea offer is the outcome that the defendant should receive.
Frye held that, to establish that he had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel, a defendant would need to show a reasonable probability that neither
the prosecution nor the trial court would have later prevented him from
134- 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
135- 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
136. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
137. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
138. The question of the appropriate remedy in Lafler and Frye was a difficult one, especially
because of existing precedent making clear that defendants have no right to a plea offer or to
the specific performance of one they happen to receive. The Court did not answer it with
tremendous specificity and left a good deal to the discretion of reviewing courts, but it
suggested that the defendant would sometimes be entitled to accept the plea that he had
either forgone or never known about because of counsel's errors. See id. at 1389 ("In [some]
circumstances, the proper exercise of discretion to remedy the constitutional injury may be
to require the prosecution to reoffer the plea proposal."); Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409-11
(requiring the reviewing court to examine whether, but for counsel's erroneous advice, the
defendant would have accepted the earlier offer, and whether the prosecution or the trial
court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented).
139. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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accepting or entering the plea offer he never received. 4 o It "should not be
difficult" for courts to evaluate such claims by defendants, the Frye majority
explained, because "in most jurisdictions prosecutors and judges are familiar
with the boundaries of acceptable pleas and sentences."'4' In other words, because
they know what a standard plea deal looks like, local trial courts are in a
position to determine whether they would have later rejected the plea that was
never communicated to the defendant. If the offer the defendant never heard
about looks like a reasonable offer, taking into account any intervening
circumstances, then the defendant may be entitled to it.
Yet, even as they legitimize and operationalize the idea that a defendant is
"supposed" to receive a "standard" offer in this way, the recent plea-bargaining
cases say nothing about whether or when prosecutors must actually make such
offers. Precedent and competing systemic values prevent the Court from
creating a substantive entitlement to a standard plea deal. Indeed, "there is no
constitutional right to plea bargain" at all. 42 Judges also have the discretion to
reject even "standard" negotiated pleas. 43 Both of these may seem like
uncontroversial points, but both depend on the central proposition-
purportedly rejected by Lafler and Frye-that plea bargaining is the aberration
and not the norm. If one really believes that plea bargaining is the criminal
justice system, it is difficult to understand why a defendant would not have a
right to plead. 1'44
The Court's inability to create a substantive entitlement to a standard deal
stems from the more general principle that prosecutors have "broad discretion"
in choosing whether and how to prosecute a case.14s But this view similarly
presupposes that trials, not pleas, are the criminal justice system. Precedent
makes clear that prosecutorial decisions are "particularly ill-suited to judicial
review" because they depend on the government's priorities and its assessment
140. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409-10. This showing is required to establish the prejudice prong of the
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
141. Id. at 1410 (emphasis added).
142. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977); accord Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406-07.
143. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)); Lafler,
132 S. Ct. at 1387. Indeed, both Frye and Lafler specify that, as it considers the remedy for the
ineffective assistance of counsel violation, the trial court retains the discretion to reject the
plea that the defendant was wrongfully denied because of counsel's errors.
144. Cf Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that, if plea bargaining is the
criminal justice system, the government's choice not to make any plea offer at all may
constitute "excluding the defendant from 'the criminal justice system"').
145. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,
382 (1982).
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of subjective factors, like "the strength of the case," that courts are not
"competent" to review.146 This logic may be motivated partly by separation-of-
powers concerns,' 47 but it is also substantially prudential.148 Regardless, the
notion that prosecutorial charging is unreviewable presumes some kind of
judicial review later in the process - that is, it presumes that trial (or at least a
more searching inquiry into the bargained-for plea than a rote colloquy) is the
norm. It would be even more unwise and equally offend the separation of
powers for the judiciary to review neither the charging decision nor the
determination of guilt. 4 9 One can only countenance the unreviewability of
prosecutorial discretion by assuming some subsequent opportunity to review
whether the defendant's conduct actually satisfies the charge filed.
The result is that our current law is an uneasy blend of half-measures:
sometimes it sees pleas as the "true" outcome, and sometimes trials. As a result,
it governs the day-to-day administration of criminal justice only through
indirection, and it imposes virtually no legal limits on prosecutorial discretion
itself.' A prosecutor may not single out a person and charge him on the basis
of his race,"' of course, but even then, it is nearly impossible for a defendant to
146. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
147. See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973)
(identifying separation of powers as "the primary ground" for courts' aversion to directing
federal prosecutions at the urging of a private party); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Its Limits, So AM. J. COmp. L. 643, 654 (2002). But see Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV.
1 (2009) (arguing that separation-of-powers concerns cannot adequately account for the
tradition of unreviewable prosecutorial discretion, and offering an explanation rooted in
English common law instead). One may wonder whether a separation-of-powers constraint
on judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial charging discretion has any force with respect to state
prosecutions and, if not, whether such concerns should affect the Court's willingness to
police prosecutorial discretion through the Due Process Clause.
148. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (expressing concern that judicial review of prosecutorial charging
decisions would "chill law enforcement" and "undermine prosecutorial effectiveness").
149. Cf Barkow, supra note 15, at 1047-50 (arguing that excessive prosecutorial discretion,
exercised through plea bargaining, may violate the separation of powers by undermining the
function of the judicial branch).
150. Political and career incentives, office culture, and repeat-player interactions with defense
counsel may help to set nonlegal boundaries on discretion. See, e.g., Norman Abrams,
Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971);
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. 959 (2009); Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1119 (2012).
151. See YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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prove that a prosecutor has done so."' The common law has long recognized
the tort of malicious prosecution, but a prosecution is not malicious unless the
defendant first establishes that it was resolved in his favor.' Where a
prosecutor has probable cause and no discriminatory motive, her freedom of
action thus remains unfettered.
B. Toward a New Standard: Vindictiveness-as-Vengeance
I have just argued that constitutional criminal procedure increasingly
recognizes that plea bargaining is the criminal justice system and must be
regulated. In doing so, it reflects an emergent understanding that there is such
a thing as a "normal" deal for particular conduct in a given jurisdiction, and
that a defendant generally ought to get that deal. But because of contrary
precedent, genuine esteem for the constitutional ideal of the jury trial, and a
"governing ideology [that] does not admit" that the prosecutor is really
making an administrative determination of guilt, 5 4 the Court is unable to
impose direct limitations on plea bargaining that would completely normalize
it as a substitute for trial.
I now argue that the idea of prosecutorial vindictiveness might help to
regulate the market for plea bargains within these legal and normative
constraints. There may be better ways to address the problems of excessive
discretion and coercive plea bargaining, including lowering and standardizing
sentence lengths and eliminating overlap between criminal statutes to reduce
the government's ability to choose between them. In the absence of such
systemic reforms, however, the idea of prosecutorial vindictiveness is
conceptually useful precisely because it is roundabout. A rule against vindictive
prosecution, properly understood, would directly regulate plea bargaining not
at the cost of further entrenching pleas as the rule and trial as the exception, but
for the sake of protecting the constitutional right to trial.
My claim is that a different standard prohibiting prosecutorial
vindictiveness could do much of the work the original was meant to do, and
could be reconciled with the pervasiveness of plea bargaining, if it defined
152. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that a defendant must provide
some evidence that the government declined to prosecute similarly situated individuals of
other races in order simply to obtain discovery on a selective prosecution claim).
153. See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) ("One element that must be alleged
and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding
in favor of the accused." (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAw OF
TORTS 874 (5th ed. 1984); Carpenter v. Nutter, 59 P. 3o1 (Cal. 1899))).
154. Lynch, supra note 128, at 2124.
1045
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
vindictiveness more narrowly and more sharply. Specifically, prosecutors could
be barred from acting with the subjective intent of punishing, as a wrong, the
defendant's exercise of a legally protected right, including and especially the
right to trial. I call this new way of understanding prosecutorial vindictiveness
"vindictiveness-as-vengeance."
This Section elaborates and defends vindictiveness-as-vengeance in three
steps: first, identifying the conduct it aims to prevent; second, describing how
it might be enforced through an evidentiary presumption; and third, arguing
why it is a good idea.
1. The Standard
Before proceeding further, it is important to explain what kind of behavior
the vindictiveness-as-vengeance standard would and would not proscribe and,
relatedly, how it differs from the rule ofBlackledge.
The prosecutor would not be prohibited from taking actions that have the
incidental effect of discouraging the defendant from exercising her legal right.
Nor would the prosecutor necessarily be prohibited from taking actions
intended to discourage the defendant from exercising the right to trial. Such
deterrence, of course, is precisely what offering a defendant a lesser sentence if
he pleads guilty is trying to accomplish, and it is what gives rise to the problem
I am attempting to solve. Rather, as I will explain, vindictiveness-as-vengeance
would inquire more deeply into the reasons behind the prosecutor's effort to
discourage the defendant from exercising the right to trial. It would ask
whether, going one step further up the chain of reasoning, the government
sought to deter the exercise of the right to trial on the basis of permissible or
impermissible motives.
Blackledge, by contrast, uses the term "retaliation" to describe what
prosecutors are not permitted to do.'s The important difference is not the
choice of words, but the underlying idea of causation that the term "retaliation"
captures. Under the "antiretaliation provision" of Title ViI,s" for instance, it is
unlawful for an employer to take adverse action against an employee "because"
she filed a complaint of discrimination or otherwise participated in
enforcement proceedings."' An employer's "retaliatory motive" inheres in the
55. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974) ("A person convicted of an offense is entitled to
pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the state will retaliate
by substituting a more serious charge for the original one .... ).
156. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 54 8 U.S. 53, 61 (2006).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-3(a) (2006).
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causal connection between the employee's protected conduct and the
employer's adverse action.'s It would be irrelevant to a Tide VII retaliation
claim that the employer did not feel wronged by the employee's protected
action, or view it with opprobrium, but simply wanted to save money on such
claims in the future. The action would still be retaliatory since it was taken
"because" the employee had engaged in statutorily protected conduct. 9
This is precisely the kind of retaliation with which Blackledge was
concerned. The subjective intent behind the prosecutor's decision was
essentially irrelevant. In fact, there was "no evidence that the prosecutor ...
acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking [the] felony indictment.n,,6 0 The
problem was one of causation: as Justice Marshall said at oral argument,
"because he appealed, he was indicted." 6 ' As applied to the plea-bargaining
context, the Blackledge rule would reach cases where, because the defendant
went to trial, he received a higher sentence. Indeed, because the proscribed
government conduct did not depend on any particular prosecutorial mens rea,
Blackledge went further and also protected defendants from the "apprehension"
of retaliation.162
Of course, it might make sense to proscribe retaliation in this way. There is
good reason for the law to prohibit adverse actions taken because of the
exercise of protected rights, regardless of the particular state of mind
underlying the causal connection between the protected right and the adverse
action.16 3 But this simply doesn't work if one takes as given that plea
bargaining exists and that the law allows it, for plea bargaining necessarily
iss. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (holding that to
assert a retaliation claim under § 20ooe-3(a), a plaintiff "must establish that his or her
protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer"); see
also Retaliation, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/retaliation.cfm (last visited Oct. 21,
2013) ("All of the laws we enforce make it illegal to fire, demote, harass, or otherwise
'retaliate' against people . . . because they filed a charge of discrimination, because they
complained . . . about discrimination . . . or because they participated in an employment
discrimination proceeding. . . .
159. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-3(a).
16o. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28.
161. Oral Argument, supra note 70, at 12:19; see supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
162. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28.
163. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.io (1998) ("The reason why . . .
retaliation [against the exercise of First Amendment rights] offends the Constitution is that
it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right. Retaliation is thus aldn to an
'unconstitutional condition' demanded for the receipt of a government-provided benefit."
(citations omitted)).
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"threatens to inhibit exercise" of the right to trial."' Therefore, vindictiveness-
as-vengeance covers only a subset of cases in which the government's plea-
bargaining tactics deter the defendant's exercise of the trial right. These are the
cases in which the government sees the defendant's exercise of his right as a
wrong warranting punishment.
But what does it actually mean for the prosecutor to think this way? My
claim is that there might be a genuine constitutional difference between two
prosecutorial states of mind. The first, permissible mindset respects the
defendant's constitutional right to trial while acknowledging that it must
frequently be traded away to satisfy the imperatives of the system. One might
imagine a prosecutor with this mindset explaining herself to a defendant as
follows: "You have the right to take this case to trial. I will seek a significantly
increased penalty if you do. I encourage you to take the deal that is in your own
best interest (relative to the alternative) as well as the government's." The
second, impermissible mindset is captured by one prosecutor who explained
his approach to plea bargaining as follows:
I'll give you a deal if you don't bust my ass. You start taking a bunch of
depositions, filing a bunch of motions - fick you.
This system is overloaded as it is. Most of these people know if
they're guilty or not. . . . If you hold out[,] . . . if you don't recognize
what you've done and try to get through here with a little bit of facility,
then I'm going to try to bust your ass.'
On this view of vindictive prosecution doctrine, then, vindictiveness means
something more like what it usually means: the prosecutor is "disposed to seek
revenge" for a perceived wrong."' Vindictiveness inheres not in the fact that the
defendant's exercise of his right causes the prosecutor to bring a higher charge,
but in the prosecutor's subjective view that the defendant's exercise of his right
is a wrong that warrants a higher charge.
Under vindictiveness-as-vengeance, it makes sense to say-as the
Bordenkircher Court tried, unpersuasively, to do-that no vindictiveness
typically arises in the plea bargaining context. For there are any number of
other legitimate state interests recognized by the law that may be the
underlying motives for the prosecutor's decision to increase charges because
the defendant goes to trial. These might include conserving resources; sparing
witnesses from inconvenience, emotional trauma, or retaliation; obtaining the
164. Id.
165. MARK BAKER, DA: PROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS 79-80 (1999).
166. See Vindictive, supra note 6.
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defendant's cooperation against others; hastening a conviction to obtain some
desired collateral consequence like a restraining order, a resignation from
office, or a civil forfeiture; or letting someone who has already served enough
time in pretrial detention go home. The prosecutor is still retaliating against
the defendant for exercising his constitutional right to trial. But she acts in
furtherance of some other legitimate goal, rather than punishing the
defendant's exercise of the right for its own sake.
Yet the reader might wonder whether what I am characterizing as the
vengeful "fuck you" motive is truly distinct from a more legitimate
prosecutorial motive. One could argue that even the prosecutor who threatens
to "bust [the defendant's] ass" if the defendant does not cooperate is, at
bottom, motivated to move the defendant through the system expeditiously to
save public resources. In other words, even if it is true that the prosecutor sees
the defendant's exercise of the right to trial as a wrong to be punished, he may
only think it is a wrong because trials waste time and money. On this view, the
inquiry into motive will identify a permissible basis for the prosecutor's
behavior if it simply goes one step deeper into his reasoning.
This is possible, of course, but it isn't necessarily true. Perhaps instead the
prosecutor's higher-level motivation is ego: "Defendants who refuse to accept
the outcome I assign them should be punished for doubting my authority."
Perhaps it is competitiveness: "I'm here to defeat the other side, and the
defendant's noncompliance makes me want to beat him that much more."
Perhaps it is actually a certain sense ofjustice: "This defendant is clearly guilty,
and if he refuses to own up to it, he ought to pay a commensurate price.", 67 Or
perhaps there is no higher-level motivation for this conduct at all, and the
prosecutor is just reflexively acting on internalized norms of office culture that
trials are bad and defendants who pursue them are to be punished. More likely,
these motives and others probably overlap and blend together. Identifying a
167. Whether this particular motivation ought to be seen as permissible or impermissible is an
interesting question. On the one hand, it is axiomatic that a prosecutor's duty is to seek
justice, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2013), and it seems
inevitable and potentially desirable that individual prosecutors bring to bear their own
personal notions of right and wrong. On the other hand, this view supposes that pleading
guilty-rather than, say, meaningfully apologizing after being convicted at trial, or being a
model prisoner during one's sentence-is the proper way to accept responsibility and
demonstrate remorse. So, this particular sense of justice is at bottom an assumption about
the rightness of pleading guilty and the wrongness of going to trial, which is essentially the
state of mind I aim to proscribe. Even if we accept as permissible the notion that leniency
should be reserved for remorseful defendants, moreover, we might still question what
degree of "leniency" for the remorseful-that is, what additional amount of harshness for
the unrepentant-is appropriate.
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person's ultimate motive for acting may be impossible, or that ultimate
motive- e.g., maximizing happiness - may be too general to be useful. Yet the
law often calls for rough and reductionist judgments of motive anyway to
assign social meaning to relevant conduct.'68 That a desire to punish the
defendant and a desire to save money can be difficult to separate does not mean
they are analytically the same or should be treated that way.
A separate but related question is whether, assuming the impermissible and
permissible prosecutorial states of mind are conceptually distinct, an external
observer can tell them apart. After all, if the "fuck you" mindset is
impermissibly vindictive, a prosecutor who adheres to it will probably not say
so to a defendant and will certainly not say so to a court. And, even if he does,
the statement is susceptible of multiple interpretations. This is a difficult but
fairly conventional proof problem whose solution is essential to vindictiveness-
as-vengeance.
2. The Evidentiary Presumption
It is difficult to determine any actor's intent with certainty, and most
people who act with an intent the law proscribes probably avoid bragging
about it to the authorities.16 9 But, borrowing from other areas of criminal law
and criminal procedure that pose the problem of evaluating an actor's
168. See Kenneth L. Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1957, 1960 (1988) ("For a
generation sociologists have understood that the social meaning of motive centers on the
interpretation assigned to action. In this sense, 'Motives are words,' the names that
interpreters give to actions in order to define situations and their consequences. . . . The
judge's determination of motive is not just a prelude to the judge's assignment of
responsibility; it is that assignment." (footnote omitted) (quoting C. Wright Mills, Situated
Actions and Vocabularies of Motive, in LIFE AS THEATRE 162, 163 (Dennis Brissett & Charles
Edgeley eds., 1974))).
169. Of course, the difficulty of proving intent has not prevented the law in other areas from
requiring plaintiffs to prove that the government acted with a proscribed motivation. See,
e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1976)
(calling for a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may
be available" to determine whether an action was motivated by racial animus in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, including such factors as the action's disparate impact, its
historical context, and its legislative or administrative history). This approach has been
heavily criticized for, among many other things, its inability to identify and prohibit conduct
primarily attributable to institutional structure rather than individual animus, as well as
conduct that the actor in question does not know stems from the proscribed motivation even
though it really does. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318-23 (1987).
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subjective intent 7 o -and, indeed, maintaining the basic structure of the old
vindictiveness doctrine' 7 - an evidentiary presumption might help.
Regardless of whether a prosecutor bargains by charging a higher crime
first and offering to drop, or by charging a lesser crime first and threatening to
add, there will be a disparity between the charge and sentence offered for a plea
and those sought at trial. This difference is the trial penalty.'7 ' Given that
prosecutors and defense counsel (especially public defenders) are repeat
players, one would expect the trial penalty for any common criminal act in a
given jurisdiction to fall within a standard range over time.'73 Indeed, in many
and probably most jurisdictions, actors in the system are well aware that there
is a "standard plea offer" for any common offense and offender profile.' 74
170. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 893.101(3) (2012) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that a person
found in possession of a controlled substance is aware of its illicit nature), upheld by Shelton
v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 691 F.3d 1348 (lith Cir. 2012); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.56.140(3)-(4)
(2012) (creating, as part of the definition of the crime of possessing stolen property, a
rebuttable presumption that a person possessing ten or more stolen beverage crates has
knowledge that the crates were stolen); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986)
(shifting the burden to the government to provide a race-neutral explanation for striking
black jurors once the defendant has made a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury
selection).
171. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969) (creating a presumption of
vindictiveness where a judge imposed a higher sentence after a new trial, but permitting the
presumption to be rebutted by "reasons [that] affirmatively appear" based upon "objective
information" about the defendant's conduct in the interim), overruled by Alabama v. Smith,
490 U.S. 794 (1989).
172 The term is widely used. See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining
and Social Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 749, 752-56 (1983); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining
as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 CluM. L.Q. 67 (2005).
173. The literature on trial penalties is vast, and its conclusions differ, but there is good evidence
that trial penalties exist, vary across local jurisdictions, and correlate with particular features
of local jurisdictions. See, e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment:
Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and jury Trial in Five Guidelines States,
105 COLUM. L. REv. 959, 973-75 (2005) (finding that defendants who pled guilty to certain
offenses received lower sentences than those who had jury trials for the same offenses, even
in states using sentencing guidelines in which a plea agreement was not a recognized ground
for departure from the guideline recommendations); Jeffery T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley,
Variation in Trial Penalties Among Serious Violent Offenses, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 631 (20o6)
(examining Pennsylvania sentencing data and finding a substantial trial penalty
that depends on characteristics of the individual offender and of the local court jurisdiction,
including caseload, local crime rate, and population); An Offer You Can't Refuse: How
US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, HUM. RTs. WATCH
102-12 (Dec. 2013), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1213_ForUploado.pdf
(documenting the trial penalty for various drug crimes in federal court).
174. I have been unable to locate any rigorous empirical research documenting the standard plea
offer, but those who practice in the criminal justice system tend, on the basis of experience,
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Where there are no formal standard offers, repeated interactions between
prosecutors and defense attorneys tend to generate stable outcomes over
time.' By implication, the "standard offer" carries with it a normal trial
penalty: the difference between the terms of the standard deal and the
exposure that the defendant will face at trial if he rejects it.
In this context, a prosecutor's unreasonably excessive deviation from the
jurisdiction's normal trial penalty might give rise to a rebuttable presumption
of vindictiveness-as-vengeance. This presumption recognizes that there are
only a limited number of legitimate motives that would justify such a
to take its existence as given. See, e.g., United States v. Heredia-Cruz, 328 F.3d 1283, 1286
(ioth Cir. 2003) ("Prior to indictment, the government extended its standard plea offer to
Mr. Heredia-Cruz. . . ."); United States v. Garcia, No. L-o7-1o38, 20o8 WL 4009239, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008) ("More significantly, the Government asserts that Garcia was
offered the 'standard' plea agreement that was available at the time."); Memorandum and
Order at 2, United States v. Perea, No. 2:o8-cr-20160 (D. Kan. Jan. 7,
2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ksd-2_o8-cr-2ol60/pdf/USCOURTS
-ksd-2 o8-cr-2o16o-o.pdf ("[G]overnment counsel informed Ms. Sahagun of the
government's standard plea offer . . . ."); Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell,
Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of
Columbia, 43 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 1063, lo65 n.8 (20o6) (noting that prosecutors in
Washington, D.C. may initiate plea bargaining in narcotics and firearms cases by sending
over "the standard plea offer"); Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From
Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 335 (2007) ("[P]rosecutors should not find
it especially onerous to produce reasonably straightforward, usable guidelines based on
what they already do, guidelines that would simply identify the standard plea deal for
commonly recurring case types."); Nicole Sterghos Brochu, That DUI Could Soon Cost
You Your Auto, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 1999, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1999-o1
-16/news/990117o1321 felony-duis-drunk-drivers-forfeiture (describing the state attorney
for Palm Beach County's longstanding "standard plea offer for felony DUI cases");
Pro Golfer Among 40 Busted in Child Sex Sting, WFTV, Jan. 18,
2012, http://www.wftv.com/news/news/local/4o-arrested-osceola-child-sex-sting/nGN9T
(reporting on Polk County, Florida officials' description of their "standard plea offer" to
defendants arrested in internet sex stings); Immigration Workin2 Group Minutes, JEFFERSON
CNTY. DIST. ATT'Y'S OFF. 6 (Nov. 6, 2008), http://cdpsweb.state.co.us/immigration
/Meetings/November6/minutes.doc (documenting a Colorado district attorney's statement
that the standard plea offer for the crime of providing false information is "to plead guilty to
a class 6 felony with a 90 day jail sentence"); Jack Townsend, Fourth Circuit Affirms
Conviction Involving Foreign Bank Accounts, FED. TAX CRIMES (June 12, 2012, 3:08 AM),
http ://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/2ol2/o6/fourth-circuit-affirms-conviction.html ("The
standard plea offer at least in the early stages of the offshore [tax enforcement] initiative was
to one plea for an FBAR violation or one plea of tax perjury.").
175. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 120-21 (1978) (explaining that "defense attorneys develop expectations
of what they consider to be a proper disposition of a case" based on similar fact patterns they
see over time, and that prosecutors generally comply with this de facto "precedent" in
negotiations).
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deviation. Thus, when the plea offered to a particular defendant entails a
substantially harsher trial penalty than the average deal, there is a reasonable
chance that the prosecutor has acted on an impermissible motive. The presence
of this reasonable chance shifts the burden to the prosecutor, who must rebut
the presumption of vindictiveness-as-vengeance by showing a legitimate
motive for the plea offer that exerts uncommonly strong pressure on the right
to trial. Although the presumption will not be perfect, it is a probative (and
easily administrable) tool for determining whether the prosecutor has acted
with a proscribed state of mind. 1 6
When a plea offer is structured to create unusually severe pressure to take
the deal, it raises the question why, exactly, the prosecutor wants this particular
defendant to suffer these consequences. Maybe she has a good answer. Perhaps
the charges are exceptionally complex, for example, so a trial would be more
costly than usual. Perhaps the evidence points strongly to the defendant's guilt
but the circumstances pose an unusual risk of jury nullification. Perhaps the
defendant has information that would be unusually valuable to the government
if he cooperated. But perhaps there is no good explanation, in which case the
best inference left is that the prosecutor is trying to punish
the defendant - "I'm going to bust your ass" - for the perceived wrong of going
to trial.
The reader may wonder why the prosecutor's legitimate interests in
conserving resources and promoting cooperation won't be sufficient to defeat
the presumption in virtually any case. It is crucial to recognize that, while those
are good reasons why trial penalties exist at all, they aren't sufficient reasons
for an abnormally large trial penalty in a particular instance. Where a standard
bargain exists, enforced by repeat-player interactions over time, it is by
definition a deal that tends to satisfy most defendants' desire to avoid the
harshest possible penalty while providing some beneficial savings to the
government. Of course, not every guilty defendant will accept that offer, for
any number of reasons. But if the government makes an offer with an
unusually harsh penalty, it is necessarily not doing what it does to encourage
cooperation and efficiency in the ordinary case. Why not? Perhaps there is
17. In most cases the abnormally steep trial penalty would presumably come from the threat of
abnormally high charges if the defendant forgoes the plea deal. In principle, however, it
could also come from an abnormally lenient plea offer. What matters is the relationship
between the two -the measure of the extent to which the right to trial is penalized. If it
seems harmful to defendants' interests to suggest that an overly lenient offer could be
considered a constitutional violation, recall that it is entirely up to the defendant whether to
raise a vindictiveness claim. The ordinary defendant will accept an unusually sweet deal;
only the rare defendant who feels extremely strongly about exercising his right to trial
would bother to bring a challenge to it.
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some relevant attribute of this defendant or this case that means he needs to be
presented with an unusual plea offer that is structured to be more coercive-
but perhaps not. Either way, reciting the government's interests in saving time
and money will be logically insufficient to explain the unusual nature of its
conduct. Because the evidentiary presumption only attaches in cases where the
most common permissible motives do not apply, we can be more confident
that the presumption will be a useful proxy for the impermissible motive of
vindictiveness-as-vengeance.
In fact, the Court has deployed an evidentiary presumption in the related
context of civil claims for retaliatory prosecution, in which a former defendant
sues an official for inducing the government to prosecute him in reprisal for
protected conduct."' Because "it would be unrealistic to expect a prosecutor to
reveal his mind[set]," a plaintiff asserting a retaliatory prosecution claim must
plead and prove that there was no probable cause to pursue the charges against
him.' Unlike the presumption I propose, the presumption in Hartman is
chiefly meant to address the issue of causation -whether the prosecutor
"would not have pressed charges" but for the protected conduct.'79 It
nonetheless suggests that it may be workable to use an evidentiary
presumption based on a rough reasonableness standard 8 o to identify
illegitimate reasons for prosecutorial behavior.
This is not to say that the evidentiary presumption is perfect. It might
occasionally chill legitimate exercises of prosecutorial discretion and creativity,
for example, although this would suppose that the presumption is vigorously
enforced and that prosecutors are not fully confident in their ability to rebut it
even when the law is properly on their side. This concern should not be
disregarded, but its likely consequences are not severe: prosecutors restrain
themselves from using the fullest possible leverage in some cases, so a few
more defendants reject pleas and go to trial, and perhaps a few more at the
margins walk.'"' There might also be a concern that the presumption could
incent prosecutors simply to increase the standard trial penalty, thus obviating
177. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (20o6). In Hartman, that protected conduct was speech.
178. Id. at 264-65.
179. Id. at 263. While Blackledge conceived of vindictiveness in terms of "retaliation" in this causal
sense, my understanding of vindictiveness is more concerned with underlying motives. See
supra text accompanying notes 155-162.
180. Probable cause arises when the facts would warrant the belief of a reasonably prudent and
cautious person that the defendant committed the crime. See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 133 S.
Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013).
181. This might be desirable on balance. Cf Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073(1984) (describing the public and private benefits of adjudication).
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any need to deviate upward from it. But that response would let the tail wag
the dog. The government has a host of other important concerns at play,
including fairness, consistency, enforcement, incarceration costs, and electoral
politics. If these have dictated an equilibrium bargain, discarding it to
maximize flexibility in the exceptional case would be strange.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that judges would engage in
statistical analysis of conviction and sentencing outcomes in order to apply this
evidentiary presumption. Because I am proposing a broad reasonableness
standard rather than a bright-line rule -no fixed percentage of deviation from
the usual trial penalty counts as "unreasonable" -I envision the analysis as
more discretionary and impressionistic. Most sentencing courts should be able
to draw on their experience in the jurisdiction to assess whether a proposed
trial penalty is unreasonably excessive. And, of course, the parties would
presumably inform the court about relevant outcomes for other similarly
situated defendants.
To see how the presumption might work in practice, consider the case of
Shane Guthrie, arrested in Gainesville, Florida, for "beating his girlfriend and
threatening her with a knife."'"I Guthrie was initially offered a plea deal that
would have resulted in two years in prison plus probation.' Based on the facts
of his alleged conduct, let us assume that this offer would have required him to
plead guilty to aggravated assault, a third-degree felony punishable by a
maximum of five years in prison.' When Guthrie turned down the deal, the
prosecutor (having previously threatened to do so, one assumes) filed
additional charges that would have resulted in a mandatory life sentence on
conviction at trial.18' At the time, Guthrie was twenty-four years old, so a life
182. See Stuntz, supra note 128, at 2549 ("[The prosecutor] has no incentive to order the biggest
meal possible.").
183. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2o11/o9/26/us/tough-sentences-help-prosecutors-push
-for-plea-bargains.html.
184. Id.
i8. FLA. STAT. § 784.021 (2013) ("An 'aggravated assault' is an assault [w]ith a deadly weapon
without intent to kill.. . . Whoever commits an aggravated assault shall be guilty of a felony
of the third degree . . . ."); id. § 7 7 5.082( 3)(d) (prescribing punishment of imprisonment not
exceeding five years for a third-degree felony).
186. Oppel, supra note 183. It is unknown what this additional charge was, but the facts described
may have supported a charge of kidnapping, a first-degree felony punishable by life
imprisonment. FLA. STAT. § 787.01 ("The term 'kidnapping' means forcibly ... confining.. .
another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to . . . inflict
bodily harm upon . . . the victim."). If Guthrie were charged as a "prison releasee
reoffender" -basically, anyone who commits a serious crime within three years of being let
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sentence would likely mean about fifty years in prison.'5 7 Thus, the prosecutor
imposed a trial penalty of roughly twenty-five times the prison term he had
initially deemed to be a sufficient punishment. This is severe enough that a
reasonable observer might suspect the prosecutor had acted in bad faith.
Under the rule I propose, the question is whether the prosecutor imposed
this penalty for permissible reasons of efficiency or impermissible reasons of
spite. If Guthrie's trial penalty were unusually and unreasonably steep, it
would tend to show that the prosecutor acted on motives other than her usual
imperatives to save money and get convictions. To challenge the additional
charges,"' therefore, Guthrie would need to make a prima facie showing that
the twenty-five-fold trial penalty was outside the normal range for similar
conduct in the jurisdiction. 1' He might do so by drawing the court's attention
out of prison for a felony-the trial court would be compelled to sentence him to life if he
were convicted of an offense punishable by life. Id. § 775.082(9)(a)(1)-(3). By statute,
discretion to seek the "prison releasee reoffender" mandatory minimum sentence resides
with the prosecutor. Id. § 775.082(9)(a)(3) ("If the state attorney determines that a defendant is
a prison releasee reoffender . . . the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the
defendant as [such]." (emphasis added)).
187. Oppel, supra note 183.
188. I assume that this constitutional violation would be no different than any other, in that the
defendant could challenge an indictment in the trial court or challenge a conviction or
sentence on appeal or on collateral review. The usual doctrines of waiver, harmless error,
procedural default, deference, and the like would apply as they ordinarily do. So, Guthrie
might attempt to quash the kidnapping indictment with a timely motion to the trial court,
or might seek to have the kidnapping conviction reversed and his sentence reduced on
appeal. (In some cases, the defendant would be challenging an extra charge, and in others
would simply be seeking resentencing.)
i8g. The relevant unit of analysis would be whatever jurisdictional division the state uses to
administer its court system and elect its prosecutors, which in most states is the county.
Comparing the prosecutor's behavior in the case at hand to the ordinary conduct of his
colleagues in the same county, who are under the same ultimate supervision and presumably
face roughly similar structural conditions and incentives, would help to assess whether any
personal animus or bad faith infected the particular charging decision under review.
There were 58,958 aggravated assaults in Florida in 2012. FLA. DEP'T OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2012 (2013),
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/f3df823d-a2b8-4od6-8ee5-do9614df22bo/CIF
annualh2.aspx. If their incidence in each county were proportional to the population,
Alachua County would have had over 750. See FLA. OFF. OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RES.,
ALACHUA COUNTY (2013), http://edr.state.fl.us/content/area-profiles/county/alachua.pdf
(reporting Alachua County population of 247,336 and Florida population of 18,801,332 in
2010). These calculations are obviously rough, but the point is that, for reasonably common
crimes, even a jurisdiction of modest size will have enough similar events that its courts can
make broad comparisons of reasonableness among them. I freely admit that this rule would
be very difficult to administer in small jurisdictions; some modification, like a statewide
comparison, might be necessary. But "the most populous counties account for the bulk of
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to the outcomes of similar cases in the public record, and perhaps by
submitting affidavits from attorneys with relevant knowledge of bargaining
practices in the jurisdiction. The court would also presumably bring its own
experience and common sense to bear.'9 o Whether the court would compare
Guthrie's case to others filed in the same year or in several recent years is an
open question; I think it suffices to say for now that the court should use a
reasonable period of comparison. 9'
If the trial court found that the trial penalty the prosecutor imposed on
Guthrie was unreasonably excessive, the burden would shift to the prosecutor
to justify it. He could point to some unique factor about Guthrie or his case
that warranted an unusually steep trial penalty. Or he could argue that the
relevant comparison was not to other serious instances of domestic violence
generally, but other instances of domestic violence involving pregnant victims,
or recidivist offenders, or some other salient fact, and explain that these cases
had been treated similarly. Ultimately, if the court found that the prosecutor
had failed to offer a plausible explanation for his conduct, it would hold that
the trial penalty violated Guthrie's due process rights.
In a case like Guthrie's, the appropriate remedy is straightforward enough.
If it is before trial, quash the indictment on the additional charge (here, by
hypothesis, kidnapping) and allow the prosecution to proceed only on the
lesser one (aggravated assault). If Guthrie has actually gone to trial and
suffered the penalty, vacate the kidnapping conviction, vacate the sentence in
its entirety, and remand to the trial court for resentencing consistent with the
Constitution.'92
felony," and presumably misdemeanor, "filings." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L
ACADs., ENSURING THE QUALITY, CREDIBILITY, AND RELEVANCE OF U.S. JUSTICE STATISTICS
151 (Robert M. Groves & Daniel L. Cork eds., 2009).
igo. Cf Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (requiring courts to use "judicial experience
and common sense" in assessing whether civil plaintiffs state plausible claims for relief).
191. Of course, if sentences for a particular crime were trending noticeably upward or downward
over time, the chosen period of comparison would affect the outcome of the analysis. But
the parties could always argue as much to the court. Because the presumption is rebuttable,
and the prosecutor has the chance to justify his behavior once the defendant makes a prima
facie case of vindictiveness, the reviewing court will always be able to take account of the
nuances of any particular situation.
192. Here, as in Lafler, the trial court will probably retain discretion in resentencing, but "the
proper exercise of discretion . . . may be to require the prosecution to reoffer the [initial]
plea proposal" that the defendant rejected. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012).
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I do not envision, however, that a defendant who pleads guilty after being
threatened with a vindictively steep penalty would have any direct remedy. 93
Vindictiveness-as-vengeance prevents the government from actually imposing
vindictively excessive trial penalties, thus undermining the credibility of its
promises during the bargaining process to do so. If defendants have a
reasonable possibility of defeating or successfully appealing unreasonably
excessive trial penalties when they are actually imposed, then prosecutors will
derive less bargaining leverage from threatening them. In the aggregate and
over the long haul, then, limiting the price the government can extract for
going to trial would combat the excessive and abusive use of leverage that
coerces defendants into bargains they do not want to accept.
3. The Merits
But, even if the vindictiveness-as-vengeance standard is workable, why is it
a good idea? I offer four basic reasons, which I broadly categorize as practical,
doctrinal, expressive, and conceptual. I address these in turn.
a. Practical
The first and simplest reason why vindictiveness-as-vengeance is desirable
is that it might provide real help to defendants who have been subjected to
truly objectionable government conduct, even if it only applies in a limited set
of cases. Take the case of Kevin Ring, a former Washington lobbyist who was
one of twenty-one defendants charged with corruption in the Jack Abramoff
scandal. 194 Unlike most of the defendants, who cooperated and pled guilty,
193. Because plea agreements typically require the waiver of any number of rights, including the
right to appeal, perhaps the only plausible procedural mechanism to assert a vindictiveness
claim after pleading guilty would be to argue that the threat of an unreasonably excessive
trial penalty made the plea itself involuntary. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175,
182-86 (2005) (discussing the requirement that pleas be knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent). But arguing that a plea is involuntary if it is secured with too steep a trial penalty
is an entirely different project than the one I am pursuing. I am trying to craft a new rule
that responds to existing doctrine and regulates pleas while respecting the right to trial.
There is a good argument to be made that threatening an excessive trial penalty makes a plea
involuntary, but that would be a different way of limiting the prosecutorial power to
coerce-and one that is squarely foreclosed by existing precedent. See Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (holding that the defendant's fear of receiving the death penalty
if he did not plead guilty did not render his plea involuntary).
194. See Associated Press, Kevin Ring Sentenced to 2o Months in Lobbying Scandal, DAILy REcoRD
(Oct. 26, 2011, 6:20 PM), http://thedailyrecord.com/2oln/io/26/kevin-ring-sentenced-to
-20-months-in-lobbying-scandal.
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Ring went to trial; the first ended in a mistrial, and the second produced a
conviction."s Though most of the other defendants served no prison time, the
government recommended a sentence of seventeen to twenty-two years for
Ring, prompting Judge Huvelle of the district court to remark, "That's a pretty
big penalty for exercising a constitutional right."'9' The government invoked a
sentencing enhancement against Ring that it had not invoked against any of
the other defendants, even though his conduct was similar or less serious.197
Judge Huvelle ultimately rejected the government's recommendation and
sentenced Ring to twenty months.'9' The facts are not precisely analogous,
since we do not know what deal Ring rejected or what alternative to pleading
guilty the other defendants faced. But this does look a bit like vindictiveness-
as-vengeance. With the other defendants already convicted and sentenced, and
thus with no need for Ring's cooperation, there would seem to be relatively few
good reasons for the exceedingly steep trial penalty the government sought. It
is at least plausible that the government was acting out of spite to punish Ring
for persisting in going to trial, and a court may not have been convinced by any
permissible motives the government asserted for its conduct. In a pretrial
challenge to the government's filing of the sentencing enhancement, or on
appeal after receiving the higher sentence, Ring might have had a good
vindictiveness claim under the standard I am proposing.
b. Doctrinal
Even if the idea is appealing, though, a critic might point out that it seems
to come out of left field. The Court could craft many sensible rules to address
this problem, but this one appears to have no particular warrant in the Due
Process Clause or any other established constitutional principle. The second
normative justification for vindictiveness-as-vengeance, however, is that it is
reasonably well grounded in the law of due process.
195. Janie Lorber, Justice Department Seeks Heavy Sentence for Kevin Ring, ROLL CALL, Sept. 2,
201, http://www.rollcall.com/news/justice-department seeks-heavy sentencefor-kevin
ring-208431-1.html.
196. Id.
197. Severe "Trial Penalty" Seemingly Urged by Feds in Sentencing ofJack Abramoff Aide, SENT'G
L. & POL'Y (Aug. 31, 2011, 11:44 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencingjlaw
andpolicy/2ou/o8/severe-trial-penalty-seemingly-urged-by-feds-in-sentencing-of-jack
-abramoff-aide.html.
198. Associated Press, supra note 194-
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As an initial matter, the standard I propose stakes out a middle ground
between Blackledge and Bordenkircher. As I pointed out above, 9 9 the
Bordenkircher majority's position that plea bargaining can involve no element of
punishment or retaliation because it is mutually advantageous to both the
prosecutor and defendant simply does not make sense. Vindictiveness-as-
vengeance would retreat from that stance by recognizing that, in a subset of
cases, the prosecutor may act vindictively even though it would still advantage
the defendant to accept the plea. And yet, most of Bordenkircher's underlying
rationale would remain undisturbed. Vindictiveness-as-vengeance would not
dispute that, for example, "by tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of
pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the
simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to
persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty."20 Nor would it
challenge Bordenkircher's prevailing view that there is no meaningful difference
between increasing charges after the defendant goes to trial and decreasing
charges after the defendant pleads guilty. The prosecutor may still "openly
present[]" the defendant with the "unpleasant alternatives" he faces.2 o'
At the same time, vindictiveness-as-vengeance would undermine, for
purposes of the right to trial, Blackledge's command that a defendant may not
be made to fear a prosecutor's retaliatory motive even where there is none. 2
And, as I have explained, it would shift the gravamen of the harm from
causation to impermissible motive. But it would still allow the most
fundamental point ofBlackledge -that prosecutorial punishment of the exercise
of a legal right is itself impermissible -to encompass one of the rights most
central to the criminal process: the constitutional right to trial.
Of course, one might fairly point out that the first half of this Note was
devoted to criticizing the combination of Blackledge and Bordenkircher as
unwieldy and unreasoned, so perhaps splitting the difference between the two
is no great achievement. Moreover, that a due process violation may turn on
the prosecutor's mens rea seems at odds with our modern understanding of
due process as a means to ensure the accuracy and reliability of government
procedures.20 3 As such, the skeptic might plausibly argue that the proposal I
igg. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
200. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
201. Id. at 365.
202. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974).
203. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517-18 (2011); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). For instance,
the prosecutor's good faith or bad faith is irrelevant to the Due Process Clause's requirement
io6o
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am advancing, even if it broadly accommodates both Blackledge and
Bordenkircher, has little to do with due process properly understood. Indeed,
vindictiveness doctrine has always been opaque about the underlying vision of
due process it instantiates.20 4
I would freely acknowledge that my claim that due process prevents
vindictiveness-as-vengeance is more consistent with a vision of due process
that is chiefly concerned with dignitary values rather than accurate results. To
some extent, this vision of due process might be an outmoded, pre-Mathews
one, recalling an era when due process was described as "[r]epresenting a
profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly
between the individual and government" -a "feeling of just treatment" rather
than a vehicle for producing correct outcomes.os But I would resist the notion
that these normative underpinnings of due process have entirely eroded. It
would be unthinkable, for instance, to hold that the quintessential due process
requirements of notice and a hearing could be satisfied by offering them to
someone other than the affected party without consent, even if we knew that
the third party could better represent the affected party's interests and produce
a truer outcome. The most fundamental principles of due process are still hard
to explain without some reference to the dignitary interests that we evoke when
we say someone "had his day in court.,,206
Perhaps for this reason, there are circumstances in which a criminal
defendant's due process rights do depend on whether an actor had a proscribed
mental state. For instance, it violates the defendant's due process rights for the
prosecutor to knowingly elicit false testimony 07 or to fail to correct testimony
that she disclose material evidence favorable to the defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963).
204. Pearce, for instance, is notable for its conclusory language that simply assumes
vindictiveness is a due process issue. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969) ("It
can hardly be doubted that it would be a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
205. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfirter, J.,
concurring).
zo6. On the desirability and limits of a dignitary theory of due process, see, for example, Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885
(1981). Of course, as Tom Tyler and likeminded scholars have demonstrated, the parties'
dignitary interests are not unconnected to the quality of the outcome, as outcomes tend to
be viewed as more legitimate and are therefore more stable when people feel they have been
heard and treated fairly. See Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 104-08 (1990). But
see Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 193, 232-36 (1992) (critiquing the assumption that every person is entitled to her
proverbial "day in court").
207. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
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he knows is false.2o8 This knowledge requirement cannot be justified solely on
the grounds of the accuracy or reliability of the outcome. False testimony will
equally distort the factfinding process regardless of the prosecutor's intent in
offering it. If the purpose of the rule were simply to deter the government from
offering testimony likely to undermine the accuracy of the proceedings, it
would make far more sense to dispense with the knowledge requirement and
prohibit the government from offering testimony that a reasonable person
would believe to be false.
I would suggest instead that this requirement may be justified in part by a
particular normative understanding of the way the criminal justice system
must treat a defendant: by engaging in a good-faith inquiry into his culpability
rather than a rigged stampede to take away his liberty. As the Supreme Court
has explained:
[The requirement of due process] embodies the fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions. It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by
mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through
the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving
a defendant of liberty through ... the presentation of testimony known
to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction
and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by
intimidation.o 9
For similar reasons, a defendant's due process rights are violated when a judge
has become so "personally embroiled" in an argument with the defendant or
his lawyer as to make the judge "unfit to sit in judgment." Because "the
concern of due process is with the fair administration ofjustice," there must be
no possibility that the sitting judge is bringing to bear anything other than "the
impersonal authority of law."210
A proscription against vindictiveness-as-vengeance would similarly
embody the Due Process Clause's underlying commitment to meaningful truth
208. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 265 (1959).
209. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112 (citations omitted). One could more cynically argue that there is no
normative vision of due process underlying this or any other requirement, for the Due
Process Clause is just a catchall for whatever guarantees of fairness courts see fit to impose. I
would disagree, but if that is true, then it doesn't really matter whether my proposal is
consistent with prior understandings of due process at all.
210. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 17 (1954)).
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seeking in which the defendant (or other person facing a state-imposed
deprivation) maintains some control over her conduct of the proceedings. For
the state to punish the criminal defendant's exercise of the right to trial as a
wrong offends this scheme: rather than simply try to persuade the defendant
that it is not in his interests to assert the right to trial, it denies that the
defendant is empowered to claim dignified adjudication at all."'
c. Expressive
The third advantage of the approach I advocate is that it conforms
reasonably well to the sort of governmental conduct that we might intuitively
wish to stigmatize as vindictive. The fit between the ordinary and legal
meanings of vindictiveness will never be perfect, and there is no particular
reason why it should be. But the old vindictiveness doctrine, which says that
the retaliatory "fuck you" approach to plea bargaining is by definition not
vindictive, seems to do a particularly poor job of capturing the social meaning
of that particular practice. If one believes that the proscription on certain
government behavior serves an expressive function for prosecutors,
defendants, or the public,"' then it seems appropriate to recognize plainly
vengeful behavior as "vindictive."
And there are many good reasons to so believe. Without digressing into the
expansive debate over law's capability to shape social and institutional
norms, it suffices here to note that many have persuasively argued that law's
affixing a label to particular conduct affects public response to that conduct.
Antismoking campaigns pointing out the deception of tobacco advertising may
cause young people to associate smoking with being duped rather than being
211. For what it is worth, proscribing vindictiveness-as-vengeance may also promote the accurate
results with which due process law is also concerned. Reducing excessive prosecutorial
bargaining leverage might reduce the incidence of false guilty pleas, for example. For
discussion of false guilty pleas and their causes, see generally Allison D. Redlich, False
Confessions, False Guilty Pleas: Similarities and Differences, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND
FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 49
(G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010); and Allison D. Redlich, Alicia
Summers & Steven Hoover, Self-Reported False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas Among
Offenders with Mental Illness, 34 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 79 (2010); When the Innocent Plead
Guilty, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http-//www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When the
InnocentPlead _Guilty.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
212. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
213. For a useful overview collecting sources, see Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of
Expressive Law, 88 IOWAL. REv. 35, 38-55 (2002).
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cool.214 Labeling sex-related teenage cyberbulling as gender discrimination may
make its victims likelier to report it and others less likely to tolerate it because
of the deeply engrained stigma that our society now attaches (at least formally)
to things called "gender discrimination.""s Laws prohibiting same-sex couples
from adopting children may reinforce harmful stereotypes that gay men are a
danger to children.21
On this theory, shaming prosecutorial vengefulness as "vindictive" rather
than tolerating it as "legal" may help to convince observers of and participants
in the criminal justice system that a defendant's right to trial is worthy of
respect. If one believes that trials are a valuable mechanism for adducing truth
and vindicating a defendant's dignity, as I do, then it is desirable in itself for
more members of the public to think that defendants shouldn't be punished for
going to trial. It may also be good for the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system for the public to believe that defendants are not in fact punished for
going to trial, though it is not clear that any such legitimacy would actually be
earned from truth.
Moreover, the expressive content of the label "vindictiveness" may itself
shape prosecutorial behavior for the better. There is a rich literature discussing
ways to encourage and reinforce more ethical prosecutorial conduct,"' and I do
not intend to intervene in the conceptual debate about how best to alter
conduct in general. The rule I propose both alters incentives (by threatening to
overturn vindictively obtained convictions and sentences) and alters meaning
(by refraining what was permissible as shameful). I simply wish to observe
that a rule that prompts prosecutors occasionally to ask, "Am I punishing the
defendant's right to trial as a wrong?" may help them avoid doing so by
214. See Sunstein, supra note 212, at 2034.
215. See Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, io8
MICH. L. REV. 373, 373 (2009).
216. See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital
Inclusion, 41 Aluz. L. REV. 1063, 1063 (1999).
217. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006) (describing the role of confirmation bias and
other cognitive errors in prosecutors' behavior); Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Thoughts on the Ethical
Culture ofa Prosecutor's Office, 84 WASH. L. REV. 11, 15-18 (2009) (discussing the importance
of hiring decisions in maintaining an ethical office culture); Bruce A. Green, The Role of
Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, ii GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19 (1997) (calling for
the exercise of personal moral judgment in the legal profession); Tracy Meares, Rewards for
Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 851, 852 (1995) (proposing "a system of financial rewards [that] could
influence the public prosecutor's charging decisions and control prosecutorial misconduct
occurring at trial").
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making them conscious of their own behavior even if they do not fear any
218
particular sanction.
d. Conceptual
The fourth and, in my view, most important benefit of vindictiveness-as-
vengeance is conceptual. My approach is helpful because it offers a way to
justify some substantive regulation of prosecutorial bargaining behavior
without entirely disregarding other important constitutional values and
precedent. Rather than, say, policing prosecutorial behavior for duress in the
formation of the bargain,"' this approach regulates prosecutorial bargaining
behaviorfor the sake ofprotecting the right to trial.
Recall the moves the Court makes in Lafler and Frye.22 o It explains that it
wants to regulate plea bargaining because the right to trial is largely irrelevant,
yet it is does so indirectly (and perhaps incoherently) because it doesn't really
foreswear the right to trial at all. The right to trial lurks just beneath the surface
as a powerful constraint on the Court's freedom of action. It is the reason, or at
least a prerequisite, for deference to prosecutors' broad charging discretion and
the lack of a right to a plea in the first place. These, in turn, are the reasons why
the Court cannot create a substantive entitlement to the standard deal that it
thinks the defendant is generally supposed to receive. So, by purporting to
consign the right to trial to irrelevance but not fully doing so, the Court ends
up regulating plea bargaining only in roundabout fashion, through the conduct
of defense lawyers.
The beauty of a rule against prosecutorial vindictiveness-as-vengeance is
that it exalts and actually protects, rather than writes off, the right to a jury
trial. But, in doing so, it actually achieves more substantive limits on
prosecutorial behavior in plea bargaining than the Lafler-Frye indirection does.
Vindictiveness inheres in intentionally punishing the defendant's exercise of
the right to trial. The need to prevent vindictiveness justifies a rule against
excessive trial penalties. This, in turn, creates a de facto substantive entitlement
to a plea deal that does not deviate too terribly from the standard one without
218. Cf L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage,
122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2645-46 (2013) (explaining, in the context of recommending reforms to
improve public defense practice, that forcing a person to confront a latent bias she did not
know she held can impel her to change it). Here, the point is that the prosecutor might not
realize that he is behaving badly until the existence of a rule identifying his behavior as bad
compels him to ask the question.
219. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 15.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 134-153.
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good reason -precisely what Lafler and Frye shy away from doing. In this way,
a revitalized vindictive prosecution doctrine can be a foot in the back door to
direct judicial review of prosecutorial charging decisions in a partly
administrative system of criminal justice.22
I concede that this sort of legal innovation may seem rather unlikely, and I
do not aim to suggest that the Court would or could create such a rule in a
single case tomorrow. Among other practical problems, because the usefulness
of vindictive prosecution doctrine is currently so limited, it is somewhat
difficult to envision the posture of a case that would let the Court move in this
direction even if it wanted to. In this dramatically changing area of the law,
however, "unlikely" is a relative term. It is hardly clear that presuming a
prosecutor's unreasonably excessive trial penalty to be vindictive is more
unlikely or more destabilizing than, say, overturning a voluntary plea because
counsel failed to advise the defendant that he might be deported as a collateral
consequence.m
More generally, however, my arguments here are intended to stake out a
different conceptual space in the ongoing discussion about regulating plea
bargaining through constitutional criminal procedure. Many supporters of the
recent doctrinal innovations have adopted a view that might be broadly
221. Rooting the doctrine in the relevance, not the irrelevance, of the right to trial also has other
incidental benefits. For one thing, it is more intellectually honest as a matter of
constitutional interpretation. There is, after all, an explicit right to a trial and not to a plea.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For another, while there is significant agreement that plea
bargaining is the norm, there is considerable skepticism that it is actually fair or desirable.
For those who hold out hope of long-term systemic reform, burying the jury trial seems like
a bad idea.
222. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). There is a healthy scholarly debate over whether
Padilla will have far-reaching or negligible long-term consequences, but the case surely
represented a significant and surprising conceptual departure from existing law. See, e.g.,
Malia Brink, A Gauntlet Thrown: The Transformative Potential of Padilla v. Kentucky, 39
FORDHAM UlB. L.J. 39, 41 (2011) ("There is no doubt that Padilla broke new ground.");
McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to "Integral": The Seismic Evolution ofPadilla v. Kentucky
and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 How. L.J. 795, 796 (2011) ("In a move ...
that shocked commentators and practitioners alike, the Supreme Court ignored decades of
lower court case law to effectively repudiate [existing] doctrine . . . ."); Margaret Colgate
Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to Counsel and the Collateral
Consequences of Conviction, CHAMPION, May 2010, at 18, 18, http://www.pardonlaw.com
/materialsAove-chin may feature.pdf (noting that the outcome "surpris[ed] even those
who had followed the case closely"); cf Jack M. Balkin, From offthe Wall to on the Wall: How
the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012, 2:55 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/202/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how
-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/2 58040 (explaining how social and political
mobilization can rapidly transform what is thought to be a "simply crazy" idea-here, the
unconstitutionality of the individual mandate - into an entirely plausible, mainstream one).
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described as: "Because the constitutional ideal of the jury trial is a dead letter,
we need to regulate plea bargaining."" Many of those resisting the Court's
recent moves have taken a view that might broadly be characterized as: "We
ought not directly regulate plea bargaining at the risk of further eroding the
constitutional ideal of the jury trial."" Yet, as this Note's discussion of
vindictive prosecution has shown, a third view is possible and perhaps
preferable: plea bargaining is amenable to regulation precisely because it is the
alternative to the constitutional ideal, which we wish to remain relevant, of the
jury trial. This simple point, while perhaps obvious on reflection, seems to
have been lost a bit in the crossfire. This Note ultimately aims, then, to reassert
it when it may be helpful in smoothing the transition from the criminal
procedure of trials to the criminal procedure of pleas. Honoring the trial as the
"24-karat test of fairness"22 s and developing a more robust law of plea
bargaining may actually be more compatible goals than we have recognized.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the Aaron Swartz case, there seems to be newfound public
momentum for constraining excessive prosecutorial discretion and making plea
223. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) ("Because ours 'is for the most part a
system of pleas, not a system of trials,' it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a
fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process." (quoting Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012))); Bibas, supra note 15, at 1119-20 (criticizing the Court
for tailoring procedure to the uninhabited "Potemkin village" of jury trial, and encouraging
direct regulation of the plea bargaining market using the model of consumer protection);
Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 40-41,
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1o97.pdf (criticizing the "essentially fictive
notion that the sentencing outcomes after trial are in fact just"); Michael M. O'Hear, Plea
Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 411 (2007) (calling for procedural
justice reforms to plea bargaining, including prosecutors' use of uniform standards to justify
bargaining positions and opportunities for defendants to tell their stories, to enhance the
legitimacy of plea bargaining). Similarly, critiquing Lafler and Frye as insufficiently far-
reaching and ultimately ineffectual, Brown, supra note 129, laments that the "adversarial
system" stands in opposition to direct regulation of plea bargaining. Id. at 133.
224. See, e.g., Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (praising the "admirable belief'
underlying systems without plea bargaining "that the law is the law," lamenting that the
Court "elevate[d] plea bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement," and
emphasizing that the defendant received "the exorbitant gold standard of American justice-
a full-dress criminal trial with its innumerable constitutional and statutory limitations upon
the evidence that the prosecution can bring forward").
225. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (No. 10-209) (Scalia, J.),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/1O-209.pdf.
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bargaining less coercive - or at least some newfound public interest in the
subject."' The question becomes where to go from here.
The cleanest and most attractive solutions to the problem may also be the
most far-reaching: eliminating overlapping provisions of substantive criminal
law, reducing overall sentence lengths, promulgating stricter and more
objective charging guidelines within the executive." 7 These aren't new ideas.
Indeed, they are old, independently good ideas. Their merits are well known,
but their effectiveness in constraining discretion, reducing coercion, and
thwarting quick-and-easy pleading may be precisely what prevents them from
being implemented. In any event, they seem well beyond the competence of the
judiciary as it develops new law in this area.
So, this Note has instead suggested an effort to square a persistent
doctrinal circle. The history of vindictive prosecution makes clear the problem.
That a prosecutor could commit a due process violation by penalizing the
exercise of a legally protected right was a somewhat accidental and ill-
considered notion from the start. As its impracticality became obvious, it was
undone almost as quickly as it originated. The law was unstable because it
made no serious attempt at an accommodation between the practicality of pleas
and the constitutional value of trials.
Our law remains caught uncomfortably between trials and pleas. Because
plea bargaining is viewed as legitimate and because the system would grind to
a halt without it, preventing prosecutors from forcefully deterring trials would
be a non-starter. Because our governing ideology maintains that the criminal
justice system ought to be meaningfully adversarial, the law should honor
rather than undermine the right to a jury trial. I have attempted to offer one
possible way out. By preventing the government from intentionally punishing
defendants who exercise the right to trial with an unreasonably steep penalty,
we can distinguish between denigrating the right to trial and merely
discouraging its exercise. In doing so, we can achieve modest substantive
constraints on charging discretion.
The idea of vindictive prosecution has the capacity to respond to some of
what seems objectionable about a system that uses the threat of astronomical
penalties to extract guilty pleas from defendants who would otherwise exercise
226. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 3-4.
227. For a useful collection of big and small ideas in the wake of the Swartz affair, see Glenn
Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime (Univ.
of Tenn. Knoxville Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 2o6, Apr. 2013), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=22o3713; and Conor Friedersdorf, 8 Ways to Stop Overzealous Prosecutors from
Destroying Lives, ATLANTIC (Jan. 21, 2013, 6:oo AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics
/archive/2o13/ol/8-ways-to-stop-overzealous-prosecutors-from-destroying-lives/26736o.
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their constitutional right to a jury trial. The government probably needs to be
able to make it prudent for the defendant to accept a plea. But the government
probably ought not be able to tell the defendant that it is wrong, indeed
impossible, for him to go to trial -a true, terrifying "offer he can't refuse" that
strips him of agency and denies him the possibility of dignified adjudication."'
Somewhere between these two states of prosecutorial mind is a line of
constitutional significance.
22s. THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972).
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